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Corporations and the Criminal Law:
An Uneasy Alliance
By JAMES R. ELKINS*
Professor Elkins has a broad background in the academics
and practice of criminal law. In addition to teaching criminal
law at DePaul University in Chicago, he spent three years in
the Justice Department as a trial attorney in the Economic
Stabilization Section and as an Assistant U.S. Attorney.
In his article Professor Elkins traces the development of
the criminal law as applied to corporations from the early days
of 18th century England to the state of corporate criminal law
in the United States today, including the proposed changes of
the Model Penal Code and the Federal Criminal Code. He
concentrates especially on doctrines imputing misconduct and
intent of subordinate employees to the corporate entities, and
the limits on doctrines of imputation borrowed largely from the
law of agency. In the face of arguments that criminal sanctions
should not be imposed on corporations, Professor Elkins con-
cludes: "The social good now demands the use of all available
means to control corporate power, including the use of criminal
sanctions."
Recent news accounts of corporate bribes, slush funds, ille-
gal political contributions and various consumer fraud schemes
have underscored the reality of corporate abuses, ranging from
questionable business practices to criminal wrongdoing.I These
disclosures indicate that corporate crime is a "normal" occur-
rence in the American business community. As one sociologist
* Assistant Professor of Law, DePaul University. B.A. 1967, J.D. 1971, University
of Kentucky; LL.M. 1975, Yale University.
The author wishes to express appreciation to Judith Goode, a law student at
DePaul University, who provided helpful suggestions and thoughtful conversations
concerning the substance of this paper. Marvin Coan, at the Department of Justice,
Washington, D.C., has graciously provided criticisms both editorial and substantive
in nature.
I Recent disclosures of corporate wrongdoing have been described as a "corporate
Watergate." The Courier-Journal & Times, June 8, 1975, § E, at 1, c. 1. This character-
ization was based upon charges of "Political payoffs, bribes of foreign officials, multi-
million dollar cash slush funds, laundering operations, disguished or improperly kept
accounts and other illegal-or at least questionable-business practices." Id.
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notes, "[t]he nation's leading corporations appear to be com-
mitting destructive criminal acts systematically and repeat-
edly; not randomly and occasionally, but as a standard operat-
ing procedure. To ensure profits at a minimum of expense,
these corporations are willfully engaging in crime. As legal enti-
ties, they, and some of the corporate officials who make deci-
sions, are criminal."' 2 More importantly, illegal corporate prac-
tices seriously affect the well-being of the American public.
The social harm created by corporations takes various
forms. Obvious examples are air and water pollution, 3 manu-
facture and distribution of dangerous consumer products, such
as mislabeled drugs and contaminated food, and consumer
frauds. Less obvious, but no less injurious, are economic crimes
such as monopolistic practices, restraint of trade, unfair trade
practices, and the improper use of corporate funds. Here the
social harm is of less direct social impact, but injurious in both
an economic4 and political sense.
2 R. QUINNEY, CRIMINOLOGY, ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CRIME IN AMERICA 136 (2d
ed. 1975).
Reserve Mining Company has recently been fined more than a $1 million in a
water pollution case. The firm was charged with the pollution of Lake Superior by daily
discharging 67,000 tons of finely ground waste rock into the lake. N.Y. Times, May 5,
1976, § C, at 34, col. 1. On the use of criminal prosecutions for environmental pollution,
see F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 7-29 (1971); Glenn, The Crime of "Pollution" The
Role of Federal Water Pollution Criminal Sanctions, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 835 (1973);
Laughran, The Law and the Corporate Polluter: Flexibility and Adaption in the Devel-
oping Law of the Environment, 23 MERCER L. REV. 571 (1972); Manaster, Early
Thoughts on Prosecuting Polluters, 2 ECOLOGY L. Q. 471 (1972); Mix, The Misde-
meanor Approach to Pollution Control, 10 ARiz. L. REV. 90 (1968); Morris,
Environmental Problems and the Use of the Criminal Sanction, 7 LAND AND WATER L.
REV. 421 (1972); Nagel, Incentives for Compliance with Environmental Law, 17 AM.
BEHAV. Sci. 690 (1974); Tripp & Hall, Federal Enforcement under the Refuse Act of
1899, 35 ALBANY L. REV. 60 (1970); Comment, The Criminal Responsibility of Corpo-
rate Officials for Pollution of the Environment, 37 ALBANY L. REV. 61 (1972).
There is little dispute that economic and corporate crime costs the consuming
public. Anticompetitive practices in one industry which result in artifically high prices
for goods create the impetus for price increases in other market areas. For example,
the monopoly of the "big three" automotive companies in the manufacture of "crash
parts" for replacement in damaged cars is reflected in increased auto repair bills and
eventually in substantially higher insurance rates. N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1976, at 34.
Every insured driver therefore pays the cost of the alleged antitrust activity regardless
of whether his car needs repairs.
The maintenance of corporate slush funds for the payment of domestic and foreign
bribes is also costly for the consuming public. The Internal Revenue Service is cur-
rently investigating the tax treatment of bribes paid by American corporations. The
bribes were undoubtedly treated or disguised in some fashion as "business expenses"
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Corporate criminal activities and individual criminal con-
duct are alike in that each creates an endangerment to safety,
health, and financial well-being. Corporate crimes are distin-
guishable.from individual criminal conduct chiefly in terms of
social impact. Higher consumer costs, increased pollution, and
more frequent physical injuries' emanating from corporate ac-
tivities result in societal harm far in excess of the harm caused
by individual criminals.7 Given the capacity of corporate enti-
ties to inflict social harm and current disclosures as to corpo-
rate wrongdoing, a reevaluation of the application of criminal
sanctions to corporate wrongdoing is necessary.
The purpose of this article is to examine the liability of
corporations for the harm producing criminal activities of cor-
porate management and corporate employees. The first section
discusses current developments which indicate the dimensions
for tax purposes. The costs of such payments are undoubtedly added to the price of
products and services offered by the offending corporations. Also, to the extent that
the corporate profits are based on markups over cost (i.e., a fixed percentage of their
costs), consumers will pay not only for the bribe, but also the increased profits based
on the bribe.
Corporations are unique in their ability to accumulate economic and political
power. Unless checked by appropriate government intervention and public pressure,
this power can be wielded to advance increasingly powerful private interests at the
expense of democratic institutions. See P. BLUMBERG, THE MEGA-CORPORATION IN
AMERICAN SociEry: THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE POWER 177-78 (1975). Corporate crime is
one way corporations increase their power and influence the economic and political
sectors of the social system.
There are, of course, legitimate means by which corporations can exert influence
on the social system. Lobbying is a first amendment right extended to corporations as
well as individuals. Corporations not only maintain a corps of resident lobbyists in
Washington, but corporate officers themselves regularly descend on Capitol Hill when
special clout is needed to pass or block a bill. See N.Y. Times, March, 7, 1976, § 3, at
3, col. 1. Even anticompetitive conduct is legally permissible as a means of preserving
the fundamental rights of lobbying. See Eastern R.R. Presidents' Conf. v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
Corporations also exert influence by financing publicity campaigns promoting
issues which affect their interests. For example, in a recent election the California
ballot contained a referendum regarding restrictive controls on the nuclear-power in-
dustry. The utility companies opposing the controls were reportedly outspending the
environmental groups during the campaign 10 to 1. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 29, 1976, §
1, at 27, col. 1.
I See R. QUINNEY, CRIMINOLOGY, ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF CRIME IN AMERICA 135
(2d ed. 1975); Geis, Deterring Corporate Crime, in THE CONSUMER AND CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY 338-39 (R. Nader ed. 1973).
1 Seney, The Sibyl at Cumae-Our Criminal Law's Moral Obsolescene, 17 WAYNE
L. REV. 777, 800-05 (1971).
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of illegal corporate conduct and the theoretical arguments
against imposing criminal liability on corporate entities. The
second section traces the historical evolution and development
of the doctrine of corporate criminal liability in both England
and the United States. Subsequent sections analyze the judi-
cial role in delineating the conditions under which criminal
liability is ascribed to corporations and the limitations on the
scope of the corporation's criminal liability.
I. INTRODUCTION
While practical and policy considerations may, in excep-
tional cases, militate against holding corporations liable for
misconduct, it is submitted that the failure to punish corporate
crimes poses a danger which far outweighs such difficulties in
the vast majority of cases. Moreover, the failure to confront the
societal problem presented by corporate crime presents a dou-
ble standard in law enforcement. The imposition of criminal
sanctions directly upon a corporation can be viewed as one
means, although perhaps not the most effective, of governmen-
tal control over the diverse activities carried out in the name
of the corporation.
The need for and the various means of imposing societal
controls on the corporation have evolved historically in re-
sponse to the proliferation of corporate activities in all sectors
of social and economic life. The activities of early corpora-
tions were relatively well controlled. Until the 1830's corpora-
tions were individually chartered by specific legislation which
delimited their activities. Early corporations were chartered to
perform specific tasks. Given the narrow purposes and limited
scope of activities, control was not a major problem.
The expanding need for capital formation during the in-
dustrial revolution was supported by state efforts to encourage
the use of the corporate enterprise by "self-chartering." 8 The
appearance of general charter corporations resulted in struc-
tural changes necessitating additional controls over corporate
activities. Governmental efforts to restrain the "free-wheeling"
private enterprise of the early 19th century came with the ad-
x On the statutory development and evolving controls imposed on early corpora-
tions, see E. DODD, AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 (1954).
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vent of the first independent regulatory agency (the Interstate
Commerce Commission in 1887) and curbs on economic prac-
tices (the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890).9 Following this land-
mark legislation the government regulation of business during
the early 20th century followed no consistent pattern, although
it was characterized by "a growing amount of legislation de-
signed to protect the public from the effects of detrimental
business conduct. . .. "10
While governmental regulation has, to some degree, con-
trolled corporate power, it has neither prevented serious social
harm nor promoted a sense of corporate social responsibility.
It is apparent then that continued attention must be given to
the reduction of unacceptable harm to private and public inter-
est." The public interest in the control of corporate activities
justifies the imposition of criminal sanctions on the corporation
as well as the individual actors directly responsible for the
criminal conduct. Of course, the criminal law is not the sole
means for furthering corporate social responsibility. That crim-
inal sanctions are ill-designed to promote all socially desirable
objectives for corporate enterprises fully does not support the
argument that the use of criminal sanctions for corporations
should be abandoned. If nothing more, the utilization of the
criminal justice system serves to call public attention to the
crying need to reduce harm-producing corporate activities.
The effectiveness of criminal sanctions imposed on corpo-
rations depends upon a number of factors, including their de-
terrent value. It is generally agreed that the use of heavy fines
and imprisonment are highly effective in deterring criminal
acts by individual businessmen.'2 The social stigma from in-
' One author has suggested that antitrust enforcement and public regulation of
business following the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission and enact-
ment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act in 1890 may have "meliorated" the "most ob-
viously antisocial activities of large-scale economic power" whereas "the general prob-
lem that was addressed-the domestication of the private social and economic power
derived from the new technology organized in corporate form . . . continues un-
abated." Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION
IN MODERN SociErY 25-45, at 37 (E. Mason ed. 1960).
R. BARBER, THE AMERICAN CORPORATION 181 (1970).
" For an extensive survey of remedies to curb corporate abuses, see Oleck,
Remedies for A buses of Corporate Status, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 463 (1973). See also
C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF CORPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975).
12 See generally Chambliss, Types of Deviance and the Effectiveness of Legal
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volvement in the criminal process is a mediating influence on
business executives who value their social standing in the com-
munity.
The stigma of a criminal conviction and its derivative de-
terrent effect, however, does not so readily apply to the corpo-
rate entity. Absent a community of interactive individuals, a
social stigma may not be present. The dissimilarity in the so-
cial milieu of the corporation and the individual creates an
entirely different "stigma effect" for criminal prosecutions of
corporations. Consequently, the deterrent value of such prose-
cutions is largely unknown.
While the corporation is not affected by "social stigma"
from criminal prosecution to the same degree as an individual,
corporations exist within a defined social and business milieu.
3
Corporations, like individuals, have an "image" to maintain
for their various "publics," which include consumers, employ-
ees, shareholders, and boards of directors, among others. 4 The
reputation of a business firm in this country is of no little
concern to its employees;15 to its customers and its potential
customers; to its creditors, suppliers, and vendors; to its busi-
ness "neighbors;" and finally, if incorporated, to its stockhold-
ers, 16 A criminal prosecution of the corporation tarnishes this
Sanctions, 1967 Wis. L. REV. 703, 712-13; Geis, Deterring Corporate Crime, in THE
CONSUMER AND CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 337 (R. Nader ed. 1973).
11 "Every major decision of a great corporation affects the public somehow, as
workers, consumers, citizens; hence the public will react consciously to every move the
company makes." P. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE CORPORATION 95 (2d ed. 1946).
"1 See generally J. RILEY (ed.), THE CORPORATION AND ITS PUBLICS (1963). "The
modern corporation is a complex social institution, projecting itself in a variety of roles
through diverse communications channels to myriad overlapping publics." Cohen, The
Measurement of Corporate Images, in RILEY, supra at 49.
" The impact of criminal fines may have a direct impact on corporate employees.
Following the electrical price conspiracy scandal and the judicial assessment of nearly
$2 million in fines, a union publication asserted that the result of criminal conduct by
the corporations "is. . . . far more likely to hurt the average worker than the $300,000
or $400,000-a-year executive . . . [ilf anyone suffers it will be the workers, through
smaller paychecks, layoffs, lower living scales." Carey, The Public Plunderers, The
Story of the Largest Criminal Anti-trust Case in U.S. History, 4 INT. UNION OF ELECT.,
RADIO & MACH. WORKERS (undated) Washington, D.C.
" Riley and Levy, The Image in Perspective, in RILEY, supra note 14, at 176, 177.
The ultimate manifestation of shareholder unrest is a shareholder's derivative
suit. The shareholder's derivative suit is a device for recovering damages from dishon-
est, disloyal or grossly negligent corporate managers. The suit is brought on behalf of
the corporation and the recovery against the corporate managers is awarded directly
to the corporation as opposed to the individual plaintiff shareholder. The fear of a
derivative suit may serve as a deterrent to corporate crime as it shifts the financial
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image for one or more of the corporation's publics'7 and affects
the corporate reputation."8
One response to the theory that the corporate "image"
makes the corporation vulnerable to a "stigma" from criminal
burden of the illegal conduct to the corporate personnel directly responsible. See Cole-
man, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 921 (1975).
11 We know too little about the "psychological, social, and cultural contexts into
which corporate images are projected. Few studies have tried to relate the acceptance
or rejection of a corporate image to more generalized attitudes toward authority and
power. Indeed, we are tempted to wonder whether or not large companies may not be
so remote from the lives of ordinary individuals that they are no longer targets for
strong, personal feelings of any sort." Carlson, The Nature of Corporate Images, in
RILEY, supra note 14, at 24, 47. See Flynn, Criminal Sanctions Under State and Federal
Antitrust Laws, 45 TEx. L. REv.1301, 1309-1310 (1967).
The problem is that the public has no definitive image of the corporation, and even
where such an image exists as measured by public attitudes there is little reason to
believe that this image is directly related to the public interaction with the firm, for
"... avenues to action by the general public are limited and often never perceived as
existing at all. Management has not yet answered the question of how it wants its
publics to translate their favorable corporate attitudes into action." Id. at 44.
See W. FRIEDMANN, LAW IN A CHANGING SociEry 209, 211 (1972):
The main effect and usefulness of a criminal conviction imposed upon a
corporation cannot be seen either in any personal injury or, in most cases,
in the financial detriment, but in the public opprobrium and stigma that
attaches to a criminal conviction. Hence, it is particularly important to limit
criminal convictions of a corporation, for offenses other than those which are
essentially of an administrative character, to those offenses that can properly
and fairly expose the corporation to a moral opprobrium.
Thus
the main purpose of a fine is not primarily to hurt the defendant financially.
It is to attach a stigma-pronounced by independent law courts-on the
breach of legal obligations which have been imposed in the interest of the
community. If a modern giant industrial concern is fined for a statutory
offense, this does not normally hurt an individual. But an accumulation of
such convictions will deservedly impair the standing and reputation of such
a concern.
See also Flynn, supra note 17, at 1310, and Million, Limitations on the Enforceability
of Criminal Sanctions, 28 GEo. L.J. 620, 644 (1940) where it is suggested that:
[tihe loss of social prestige could have an economic result (i.e., loss of "good
will" in the economic sense) which would make a conviction more costly than
a civil judgment for the same amount as the fine involved. Many directors
would be little concerned with social approval of their enterprise, as such,
but to those feeling a sense of personal identity with- the corporation and
having pride in its standing such an actual deterrent may be said to exist.
Such a feeling often exists on the part of lesser employees who have served
a number of years.
One commentator has offered the unsupported argument that "it would be poor
public policy to rely on the stigma of a conviction to deter corporate polluters." Com-
ment, The Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials for Pollution of the Environ-
ment, supra note 3, at 63.
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prosecution is that some corporations are so large that they are
immune from stigmatization.19 This argument is based on the
notion that the larger the corporation the more diffuse and
ambiguous the corporate "image;" especially in view of the
variety of "publics" it serves. The logic of the argument is
sound but not totally persuasive. Phillip Blumberg, an ob-
server of corporations, argues that the visibility of the mega-
corporation acts as a social restraint:
[T]he very visibility of the mega-corporation renders it more
likely to be the subject of public reaction and thus will tend
to restrict its ability to act. The decision of the large corpora-
tion becomes a cause celebre while the more obscure action
of the smaller firm is less likely to trigger aroused public
attention, which may not be involved in the acts of smaller
business. 20
But while corporate size may act to shield individual ac-
tors, it increases the visibility of the corporation in the public
eye. Thus, the unfavorable public attention which is focused on
the corporation as a result of criminal prosecution may deter
illegal corporate activities and encourage the corporation to
restrain the activities of its employees.
2'
" Other arguments have been raised to refute the position here that "image"
conscious firms are adversely affected by criminal prosecutions. One commentator
notes:
First, the extent to which a corporation will spend money so as to avoid being
labelled "criminal" in the eyes of the public is totally uncertain. Second, the
argument ignores the situation of corporations which market either anony-
mous products (i.e., nuts and bolts) or products under brand names totally
unrelated to the corporate name, and corporations whose clientele consists
solely of other corporations.
Laughran, The Law and the Corporate Polluter: Flexibility and Adaption in the Devel-
oping Law of the Environment, supra note 3, at 587.
11 P. BLUMBERG, THE MEGA CORPORATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY: THE SCOPE OF COR-
PORXrE POWER 39 (1975) (footnote omitted). But see Comment, Increasing Community
Control Over Corporate Crime-A Problem in the Law of Sanctions, 71 YALE L. J. 280,
287-88 n. 35 (1961).
21 "In small societies or communities where everyone tends to know each other,
adversely publicizing wrongdoers can have a significant effect on changing their behav-
ior. Such a system of social control normally would not work in an industrialized,
urbanized society at least for individual misbehavior. Large firms selling widely known
brand name products might, however, be substantially influenced by the threat of
well-circulated adverse publicity."
"Such a system of publicizing misbehavior is partly behind the information circu-
lation of the Securities and Exchange Commission, although the SEC merely provides
[Vol. 65
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Further encouragement to curtail harm producing activi-
ties may be forthcoming from the board of directors and share-
holders upon their learning of corporate misconduct. The
Model Penal Code provides for corporate criminal liability on
the theory that potential criminal sanctions encourage corpo-
rate supervision of company employees.
2
The primary argument against the imposition of corporate
criminal liability is that criminal fines, as presently applied,
are hopelessly inadequate for deterring future criminal acts.,-
The criminal fine is often so small that criminal violations are
economically more advantageous than compliance. Thus, the
fine has no deterrent effect. A fine of several thousand dollars,
while it might destroy a small business, is a negligible factor
in the budget of General Motors, and hardly overcomes the lure
of large profits or increased political power to be gained from
some forms of illegal activity.
There are two basic approaches to the use of criminal fines
as sanctions which produce the maximum deterrent effect. The
first approach would increase the statutorily authorized fines
and persuade the courts to impose maximum fines in cases
which warrant severe penalties.24 The second approach calls for
a scale of fines keyed to the economic resources of the offending
potential stock purchasers with information on specific companies without evaluating
the companies." Nagel, supra note, 3 at 699-700.
On the use of publicity as a deterrent to corporate crime see generally Fisse, The
Use of Publicity as a Criminal Sanction Against Business Corporations, 8 MELB. UNIV.
L. REv. 107 (1971); Fisse, Responsibility, Prevention & Corporate Crime, 7 N.Z. UNIV.
L. REv. 256, (1973). The argument here favoring more extensive publication of corpo-
rate wrongdoing should be considered in the context of the publicity which is given to
corporate crime.
"[The type of publicity given white-collar crimes, as contrasted with the
more overt crimes like burglary or larceny, seldom creates much publicity.
It is therefore difficult to create and sustain the kind of public pressure
needed for the enactment of stronger legislation designating this type of
behavior, however antisocial, as 'criminal.'"
Clinard, White-Collar Crime, in 3 INT. ENCY. OF THE SOC. Sci. 483, 486 (D. Sills ed.,
1968). See also H. PACKER, THE LiMrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 361 (1968).
n MODEL PENAL CODE 52.07, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
2 Flynn, supra note 17, at 1309; Community Control Over Corporate Crime, supra
note 20, at 284-87; Davids, Penology and Corporate Crime, 58 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S.
524, 528 (1967).
21 In the electrical equipment conspiracy cases, the average fine was $16,550, even
though the Sherman Act authorized up to $50,000. Community Control Over Corpo-
rate Crime, supra note 20, at 287.
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corporations. The fine would be a fixed percentage of gross
profits, or of net income after taxes. With such an approach,
the criminal fine would serve as an effective deterrent by itself,
since it would have a profit-diminishing impact on the corpora-
tion.
Finally, we must consider who is actually punished when
criminal sanctions are imposed upon a corporate entity. The
continued use of the criminal sanction against corporations has
been resisted on the theory that the criminal fine is absorbed
by the corporation with the real punishment being passed on
to shareholders and creditors. It is also argued that, the fine
can be recouped in the form of higher prices, 25 although there
are other economic factors, competition, for example, which
may make price increases impractical. 2 Fines of sufficient
magnitude to be profit-diminishing will in some instances be
paid by shareholders in the form of decreased dividends. Such
a burden on shareholders is not manifestly unfair, however,
even where they could not have known or protected against the
illegal corporate conduct. The law protects the shareholders
with limited liability to induce risk capital in the corporate
enterprise, and the loss of profits due to corporate criminal
fines should be viewed as an investment risk.
One of the more persuasive arguments advanced against
corporate criminal liability is that the greatest deterrent effort
is achieved when individual actors responsible for criminal
wrongdoing, as opposed to the corporate entity, are prose-
cuted .2 This argument does not undermine the case for corpo-
rate criminal liability. Obviously, every effort should be made
to prosecute individuals responsible for illegal acts. On occa-
sion, however, it will be clear that certain individuals in the
2' The Criminal Responsibility of Corporate Officials for Pollution of the
Environment, supra note 3, at 62.
26 Fines levied against individuals may be equally ineffective if the corporation
indemnifies the individuals. See Note, Indemnification of the Corporate Official for
Fines and Expenses Resulting from Criminal Antitrust Litigation, 50 GEO. L.J. 566
(1962).
2 "What really matters is the effectiveness of placing criminal liability in the
corporation rather than the individual who acts for it. There is absolutely no evidence
that corporate criminal liability is any more effective than personal criminal liability.
Indeed indications are that if the prevention of crime, as distinguished from mere ease
of conviction, is our aim, individual liability is preferable." Mueller, Criminal Law
and Administration, 34 N.Y.U.L. REV. 83, 93-94 (1959).
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corporate structure have committed or caused to be committed
a crime benefitting the corporation without leaving sufficient
evidence of their identity.
In other cases, where sufficient evidence for indictment of
identified individuals within the corporation exists, it may be
fundamentally unfair to proceed against them..This is espe-
cially true in cases where evidence is sufficient to proceed
against lowlevel subordinates but not their complicitous super-
visors or management personnel.
28
The problem in identifying individuals within the corpora-
tion responsible for illegal conduct is further exacerbated by
the range in size and structure in corporations. The size and
structural diffusion of the modern corporation often masks
"individual" responsibility and makes it extremely difficult to
investigate and successfully prosecute corporate-related
crimes.29 Smaller corporations present a greater opportunity for
ferreting out and punishing the individual actors since in these
cases the corporation does not effectively shield individuals
1 While the general consensus is that the more effective deterrent is the prosecu-
tion of individuals rather than the corporation, there may be an element of unfairness
in proceeding against the subordinate employees individually when the very nature of
the crime requires involvement or acquiescence of higher corporate officials. G. WIL-
LIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW (2d ed. 1961). See Kadish, Some Observations on the Use of
Criminal Sanctions in Enforcing Economic Regulations, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 423, 430-
31 (1963).
In the case of a criminal antitrust prosecution it can be argued that responsi-
bility in the modern corporation is diffused among so many executives that
it is difficult, if not impossible, to fix personal responsibility for the corpora-
tions' crime. In these circumstances, it might be unfair to indict, for exam-
ple, an assistant sales manger for participation in a meeting with representa-
tives of his company's competitors at which prices were fixed, and impossible
to obtain convincing proof that the assistant sales manager's agreement was
authorized or ratified by the president or the vice-president in charge of
sales. Under these circumstances, the Antitrust Division might well hesitate
to seek an indictment against the subordinate and, hence, would prosecute
only the corporation.
Comment, Criminal Prosecution for Violations of the Sherman Act: In Search of a
Policy, 48 GEO. L. J. 530, 540 (1960). See Flynn, supra note 17, at 1324. For a more
recent discussion see United States v. Park, 422 U.S. 658 (1975), and Comment, 13
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 299 (1975).
23 For cases in which corporate officers were acquitted and the corporation con-
victed see American Medical Ass'n. v. United States, 130 F.2d 233 (D.C. Cir. 1942),
(aff'd. on other issues, 317 U.S. 519) United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d
376 (7th Cir. 1941); United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229, 233 (2d Cir.
1929); United States v. American Socialist Soc'y, 260 Fed. 885 (S.D.N.Y. 1919). See
also MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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from detection and punishment."0 However, where the prosecu-
tor determines that the corporation should be prosecuted in
addition to the individuals, such prosecutions will undoubtedly
be aided by the relative ease in associating the individuals with
the corporation. The individuals will often be the corporate
officers themselves. This "link" between the corporate officer
and the corporation, which is most pronounced in a small cor-
poration, has resulted in a disproportionate incidence of prose-
cutions against small corporations. 31
Finally, the very nature of corporate crime makes prosecu-
tion difficult:
It may range from the comparatively simple reciprocal rela-
tionships in a business transaction to the more complex pro-
cedures in the illegal activities among several large corpora-
tions. The latter may not only include another corporation,
but may extend to many corporations and subsidiaries. The
illegal activity may be quite informally organized, as in false
advertising, it may be simply organized, though deliberate,
as in black market activities, or it may be complex and in-
volved, as in antitrust violations.2
It is the thesis of this article that arguments typically
raised in opposition to the imposition of criminal liability are
misdirected. First, there is every indication that the critics of
criminal sanctions for corporations have failed to recognize the
11 The available statistics on criminal antitrust prosecutions suggest
that the smaller the corporate defendant, the easier it is to impose crimi-
nal sanctions upon those responsible for the corporation's antitrust vio-
lation. In fact, attempts to impose criminal penalties upon the managers of
large corporations have usually proved fruitless, particularly when the indi-
viduals and the corporation were tried together. Even though it is logically
inconsistent to convict the coorporation and exonerate those who control the
corporation or act on its behalf, individual defendants and juries have often
shifted the responsibility for a violation to the corporation.
Flynn, supra note 17, at 1305-06.
31 "Perhaps the most serious objection to current [Department of Justice, Anti-
trusti Division policy in criminal cases is that it, in effect, discriminates against the
principal officers of small companies whose responsibility for the acts of their corpora-
tions is usually direct and readily ascertainable. In contrast, the responsibility of the
principal officers of large corporations is usually indirect and diffused. Accordingly, it
is this type of corporate officer who most usually escapes indictment." Criminal Prose-
cutioms for Violations of the Sherman Act, supra note 28, at 540-41.
3 R. QUINNEY, supra note 2, at 137. On the relationship between modern corporate
decisionmaking and the punishment of corporate crime, see Note, Decisionmaking
Models and the Control of Corporate Crime, 85 YALE L.J. 1091 (1976).
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full social impact of corporate crime. Secondly, the corporation
has been viewed through models which inadequately account
for the full panoply of societal forces which affect the modern
corporation. If the corporation is viewed within its social mil-
ieu, the control of corporations by use of criminal sanctions can
be justified. The crucial aspect of this approach is "that the
enterprise reacts to the total societal environment and not
merely to markets. "3 3 This "social environment model" of the
corporate enterprise recognizes the market and profit orienta-
tion of corporate behavior but is more inclusive in the consider-
ation given to general corporate social responsibility.
IL HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
A. England
The English historian Holdsworth places the historical
appearance of the corporate form in England at the end of the
14th century.34 Although a "passive entity" during this period
35
it "was received by the common lawyers because it supplied a
useful explanation of certain associations which frequently
appeared in the law courts as the owners of property or fran-
chises, [and] a useful theory for the regulation of their activi-
ties. .... 31
The corporation of medieval England bears little resembl-
ance to the modern commercial corporation. The medieval
predecessor of the modem business firm was either an eccle-
siastical body designed to care for and manage church prop-
erty37 or an organization of the public activities of the English
boroughs and the craft and mercantile guilds which flourished
at the time.38 Prior to the founding of our own country, how-
" N. JACOBY, CORPORATE POWER AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILrIY 194 (1973).
31 W. HoLswoRTH, 3 HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 470 (3rd ed. 1923). See also Chayes,
supra note 9, at 33. One recent commentator has noted that the corporation had its
genesis in the Roman Empire. Campbell, Limited Liability for Corporate Sharehold-
ers: Myth or Matter-of-Fact, 63 Ky. L.J. 23, 23-24 (1975) (citing C. ABaorr, RISE OF
THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 20 (1936) and W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES OF THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND 498 (Chitty ed. 1832)).
31 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 474.
" Id. at 470.
3' Id. at 471-74; Chayes, supra note 9. On ecclesiastical corporations and the
influence of religion on the corporate form generally, see J. DAvIS, CORPORATIONS 35-87
(1961).
" Chayes, supra note 9.
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ever, the medieval corporate form had evolved sufficiently to
be used in the organization of English mercantile groups.
Thus, by the 17th century, the corporate enterprise in England
could accurately be described as "an admirable instrument of
a mercantilist economic policy."3
It is difficult to ascertain whether the early English corpo-
ration was subject to criminal sanctions at common law. It is
generally reported that corporations of this era were not held
criminally responsible. Holdsworth commented that corpora-
tions "could commit neither sin or crime; and some said no
tort-truly suitable representatives for saints and churches."40
The judicial validation of Holdsworth's pithy statement of the
common law came from Lord Holt, sitting Chief Justice on the
King's Bench at the beginning of the 18th century. He is re-
ported to have stated, "[a] corporation is not indictable, but
the particular members of it are."'" In 1765, Blackstone in his
Commentaries followed with the pronouncement that, "[a]
corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime,
in its corporate capacity; though its members may in their
distinct individual capacities.
42
The generally stated rule that corporations were not sub-
ject to indictment must be qualified, if not abandoned, in light
of the criminal liability imposed on 18th century corporations
for nuisance.13 The liability of early corporate entities for such
"nonfeasance" (i.e. the failure to perform a public duty im-
3, Id. at 31. See generally W. SCOTT, THE CONSTITUTION & FINANCE OF ENGLISH,
SCOTTISH & IRISH JOINT STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720 (3 vols.) (1909-1912). A history of
corporations in England following 1720 can be found in A. DuBois, THE ENGLISH
BUSINESS COMPANY AFTER THE BU3BLE ACT, 1720-1800 (1938).
JO HOLDSWORTH, supra note 34, at 471-74.
' Anonymous, 88 Eng. Rep. 1518 (K.B. 1701). This case is uniformly cited by legal
writers as the basis of the early rule that corporations could not be held criminally
liable. See, e.g., 1 J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 307 (1st ed. 1856).
42 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 476 (1765).
4' See L. M. LEIGH, THE CRIMINAL LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS IN ENGLISH LAW 16
(1969); Barnett, The Criminal Liability of American Municipal Corporations, 17 ORE.
L. REV. 307 (1938).
Bishop, in the first edition of his treatise on the criminal law, indicated that
"Some corporations, and probably all, have always been indictable in respect to some
things." I J. BISHOP, CRIMINAL LAW § 306 (1st ed. 1856). See Hitchler, The Criminal
Responsibility of Corporations, 27 DICKINSON L. REV. 89, 90 (1923). See, e.g., Evans &
C. Lts. v. L.C.C., Annon., 12 Mod. 559 (1700) (where a company was held to have
committed a criminal offense by keeping open a shop in violation of a statute). See
also Regina v. Saintiff, 6 Mod. 255 (1705).
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posed by the state) dates to the 17th century when the Crown
prosecuted counties and unincorporated boroughs to abate
public nuisances." It was for such acts of nonfeasance, gener-
ally public nuisance, that the English courts first imposed cor-
porate criminal liability. Thus, it appears that the common law
view expressed by Chief Justice Holt and reiterated by Black-
stone did not apply to certain quasi-corporate entities such as
municipalities, boroughs, and counties, the common law duty
to repair and maintain roads and bridges being sufficient to
impose criminal sanctions on the corporate entity. 5 These
cases theorized that the neglected duty ran to the town or
county as a collective entity representing all of its residents,
rather than any individual office holder. Thus, the failure of a
town to repair a highway constituted a breach of this duty
which was viewed at law as a nuisance abatable by criminal
proceedings.
The early common law view, which generally precluded
corporate criminal liability except for public nuisance resulting
from nonfeasance, was justifiable upon consideration of the
societal and economic role of corporations at the time of Lord
Holt's announcement in the early 18th century. The use of the
corporate enterprise was in its infancy and there was little
need, therefore, to impose criminal sanctions to control organi-
zations which had so little impact on the citizenry. With the
growth of the corporate form and the increasingly important
economic and societal role assumed by corporations," the view
" LEIGH, supra note 43, at 16.
45 Chitty's treatise on criminal law points out that:
At common law, the general charge of repairing all highways, lies on the
parishes through which they pass . . . .No agreement can exonerate the
parish from the common law liability to repair . .. ."
3 J. CHrrry, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAw 566a (5th Ed. 1847).
Any of these roads, which are common to all his majesty's sub-
jects-whether they be for the use of carriages, horses, or foot passengers
only, or whether they lead directly to a market, or only from one town to
another, or even from a hamlet may properly be termed high or common
ways, and any default in those bound to repair them, or obstructions laid
upon them, may be redressed by criminal process. . . .It has also been laid
down, that an open river may be termed a highway, and is protected by
similar proceedings.
Id. at 565.
,1 It has been noted that "the evolution of the criminal law has been in response
to deep-seated economic and social wants." The doctrine of corporate criminal liability
is no exception. Hall, The Substantive Law of Crimes, 1887-1936, 50 HARV. L. REv. 616
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expounded by Lord Chief Justice Holt and Blackstone that
corporations could not be held criminally liable was destined
to be reconsidered by the courts.
England did not, however, finally determine whether cor-
porate responsibility for criminal acts would be imposed upon
commercial corporations until the 19th century. It was not
until 1842, in Queen v. Birmingham & Gloucester Railway
Co., 47 that a corporation's responsibility for criminal actions
was expressly delineated. In Birmingham & Gloucester Rail-
way Co., the corporation itself was indicted for failure to com-
ply with a legal mandate directing the corporation to remove a
bridge which it had erected over a road. The English court
found that where a statute has created a legal duty upon a
corporation to carry out certain acts and the acts are not per-
formed, the corporation may be indicted and fined for its non-
feasance. The imposition of criminal liability upon the defen-
dant railroad corporation in that case represents the first major
step in the evolution of the modem doctrine of criminal liabil-
ity for commercial corporations. The case represents the first
major inroad upon the reported 18th century common law view
expressed by Chief Justice Holt that "a corporation is not in-
dictable."
The next major development in the application of corpo-
rate criminal liability in the English courts came in Queen v.
Great North of England Railway, 48 in which a railway company
was indicted for a nuisance in obstructing a highway by a rail-
way line, an affirmative act. The corporation defended by an
attempt to distinguish the acts of "nonfeasance" on the part
of the corporation in Queen v. Birmingham & Gloucester Rail-
way Co. from the misfeasance by affirmative act in the present
case. Lord Denman ruled, however, that the corporate misfeas-
ance was legally indistinguishable from previously considered
cases involving nonfeasance since it is "as easy to charge one
person or a body corporate with erecting a bar across a public
road as with the non-repair of it; and they may as well be
compelled to pay a fine for the act as for the omission."49 Lord
(1937). See generally Ohlin, The Effect of Social Change on Crime and Lau,
Enforcement, 43 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 834 (1968).
17 114 Eng. Rep. 492 (Q. B. 1842).
115 Eng. Rep. 1294 (Q. B. 1842).
Id. at 1298.
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Denman held that corporations as well as individuals were
amenable to criminal prosecution and that the scope of corpo-
rate liability was not limited to acts of nonfeasance, but would
include a case of public nuisance arising from misfeasance.
By 1850 the common law of corporate criminal liability
had evolved as a means of sanctioning corporations for failure
to perform a variety of duties imposed by law. These early
decisions, however, with the exception of cases involving public
nuisance, did not support the expansion of liability to include
crimes which required criminal intent5 0
The liability of English corporations for intentional crimes
was judicially sanctioned in the early years of the 20th cen-
tury,5' although not fully established until World War 11.52
B. The United States
The historical evolution of the corporate form in the
United States has followed much the same pattern as in Eng-
land. The earliest corporate entities in this country were the
towns, boroughs, and cities, or what today would be character-
ized as public corporations. 3 In fact, the colonial legislatures
were forbidden by the English Parliament from granting corpo-
rate privileges for business purposes54 and the colonists were
notably slow in their development and use of the corporate
'form for commercial enterprises.55 As in England, a number of
'* The prosecution of municipalities and counties in the 18th Century was de-
signed to secure road repairs and removal of highway and watercourse obstruction.
Such early prosecutions did not require a showing of criminal intent since the object
of the prosecution was not punishment but the abatement of the nuisance. Chitty,
supra note 45. For example, Chitty finds stage coach proprietors indictable "if stage
coaches regularly stand in a public street of London, though for purposes of accommo-
dating passengers, so as to obstruct the regular track of carriages . . . ." Id. at 606.
In such cases Chitty argues that it is unnecessary "in order to fix the responsibility on
the defendants, to show that he immediately obstructed the public way, or even
intended to do so: it seems to be sufficient, if the inconvenience results. . . ... Id. at
607.
'I Mousell Brothers, Ltd. v. London & North-Western Ry., [1917] 2 K.B. 836.
52 LEIGH, supra note 43, at 29-36; Andrews, Reform in the Law of Corporate
Liability, THE CraM. L. REV. 91, 92 n. 9 (Feb., 1973).
5 During the colonial period, the law did not differentiate between private and
public corporations. See 2 J. DAvis, EssAYs m THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN
CORPORATIONS 49, 75 (1917).
51 Baldwin, Private Corporations, in Two CENTURIES GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW
1701-1901 at 267-268 (1901).
m "It took the descendants of the English colonists in America a long time to
emancipate themselves from their inherited prejudices against private corporations."
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the colonies had allowed the incorporation of religious societies
for the support and maintenance of church property.-6 The con-
cept of the corporation in colonial society involved the organi-
zation of individuals based on residence and the performance
of various public functions. 7
At the turn of the 18th century, private business corpora-
tions began to appear in increasing numbers and existed along-
side the "early specimens" of the corporate form s In numeri-
cal terms, however, the business corporation was still in its
infancy as there were reportedly only some 335 operative corpo-
rations at this time,5" and they were generally insignificant
throughout the Colonial era. 0
The earliest corporations were clearly invested with public
functions of interest to a developing nation. One writer has
noted that bank and insurance companies, together with com-
panies devoted to the development of transport by canal or
turnpike, to water supply and to fire fighting, comprised most
of the approximately 335 corporations that had been chartered
in the United States by 1800.61
Id. at 275-76. State legislatures chartered only approximately 317 corporations during
the period 1780 to 1801. J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE LAW OF THE BUSINESS CORPO-
RATION IN THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 14 (1970).
11 DAVIS, supra note 53, at 75; Baldwin, supra note 54, at 266. Baldwin notes that
religious societies "had been freely incorporated both by the royal Governors and the
colonial Assemblies, and soon acquired considerable possessions, some of them receiv-
ing public grants." Id. at 273.
57 Chayes, Introduction in J. DAVIS, CORPORATIONS xix (1961); Mason, Corporation,
in INT. ENCY. Soc. Sc. 396, at 397 (D. Sills, ed. 1968).
" Chayes, supra note 9, at vii. J. Hurst, one of our foremost legal historians, could
find "no evidence of significant demand for corporate charters for legal enterprise until
about 1780; both opportunity and means were lacking for undertakings ambitious
enough to invite using the corporation." J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATION IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970 at 7 (1970). See E. DODD,
AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860 at 10-13 (1954).
1' For a list of 250 corporations which one author has found in existence prior to
1800, see Baldwin, supra note 54, at 296-311.
,1 "Business corporations which were colonial both in origin and activity were few,
and on the whole, of no great importance. Only as the colonial period drew to a close
did several come into existence, and even those were hardly typical of present-day
business corporations." DAVIS, supra note 53, at 87.
" See Chayes, supra note 9, at vii.
Of the charters granted prior to 1800 for moneyed corporations, two-thirds
were of a quasi-public character, and such as carried or might properly have
carried the right of eminent domain, most of these were for the improvement
of transportation facilities by roads, bridges, and canals, or by deepening
rivers or harbors. Of the corporations whose business would bring them into
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It was the public and municipal corporation on which
criminal liability was first imposed in this country. Prior to the
widespread appearance of corporations engaged in commercial
activities, the courts upheld criminal indictments and convic-
tions of towns and municipalities for nuisance arising out of the
neglect of statutory duties 2 such as the repair of highways and
bridges. 3 For example, the city of Albany, N.Y., was indicted
in 1834 for nuisance in permitting the basin of the Hudson
River to fill with mud, rubbish, and the carcasses of dead ani-
mals and failure to remove these obstacles from the basin. 4
The court stated that
[iut is well settled that when a corporation or an individual
are [sic] bound to repair a public highway or navigable river,
they are liable to indictment for the neglect of their duty. An
indictment and an information are the only remedies to
which the public can resort for a redress of their grievances
in this respect. 5
The early cases are significant because municipal corporations
were the most prominent form of corporate entity during the
first years of the republic.
The first decisions considering the question of criminal
liability for corporations other than municipalities can be
traced to the 1820's and 1830's when the first commercial cor-
porations were involved in the construction and operation of
daily contact with the people at large, irrespective of locality, there were less
than eighty, the most considerable of which were twenty-eight banks and
twenty-five insurance companies. Although commercial corporations were
few in number, the number of public and municipal corporations, religious
societies, academies, library companies and public quasi-corporations, such
as drain companies, had become very large, and probably approached two
thousand.
Baldwin, supra note 54, at 276. See also, J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS
CORPORATIONS IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780-1970, at 17-18 (1970).
62 Gerhard Mueller has noted that corporate criminal liability can be traced to
early English cases involving nuisance. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U.
PITT. L. REV. 21, 39 (1957).
&I See, e.g., State v. Dover, 9 N.H. 468 (1838), where a state court refused to quash
an indictment charging the town of Dover, N.H., with failure to provide a highway as
required by law. See generally 17 E. McQUILIN, LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION §
49.88 (3d ed. 1968).
" People v. Albany, 11 Wend. 539 (N.Y. 1834) (rev'd on other grounds).
,3 Id. at 543 (emphasis in original). See also State v. Shelbyville, 36 Tenn. 176
(1856).
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turnpikes, canals and bridges. The activities of these early pri-
vate commercial ventures were closely related to the functions
performed by municipalities and counties of that day,6 and it
was not difficult for the courts to see the analogy in imposing
criminal liability. These judicial decisions appeared before
the English courts had firmly established the liability of Eng-
lish corporations beyond public nuisance and the American
courts did not, therefore, have benefit of a settled rule of Eng-
lish common law. A number of our early cases suggested that
a corporation was not indictable 8 although the rule was never
adopted by a majority of jurisdictions. As early as 1836 a pri-
vate turnpike road company was indicted for common law
nuisance in maintaining a road in a state of disrepair, the court
finding "no room for doubt that the company was liable to be
proceeded against by indictment."69
The criminal liability of such quasi-public corporations
was a creature not only of judicial decision but of legislative
enactment. An act passed by Massachusetts in 1804 (The Gen-
eral Turnpike Act) specifically made turnpike corporations
"liable to pay all damages, which may happen to any person
from whom toll is demandable, for any damage which shall
arise from defect of bridges or want of repair of said turnpike
road; and also liable to presentment by a grand jury, for not
keeping the same in good repair."7
16 See A. BERLE and G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
10 (rev. ed, 1967); L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 166-167, 446 (1973).
11 The extension of criminal liability from municipal corporations to the early
commercial corporations did not require major shifts in legal reasoning. The quasi-
public nature of the activities of the first commercial corporation and the characteriza-
tion of their misdeeds as a nuisance permitted the imposition of criminal liability. In
an early Pennsylvania case where the corporation had been charged with nuisance
arising from negligently maintaining a canal in a manner so as to allow water to escape
and form stagnant pools, the court pointed out:
[Corporations] other than municipalities may become amenable to the
criminal law in the matter of the creation and maintenance of things which
amount to or become public nuisances, and to be proceeded against by
indictment. . . . As a general rule they are not indictable for misfeasances
unless indeed they assume the shape of nuisances.
11 See McKim v. Odom, 3 Bland. 407, 421 (Md. 1828) (dicta); Orr v. Bank of the
United States, 1 Ohio 28 (1822) (dicta) (citing Justice Holt's statements reported at
12 Mod. 559, the court rejected the argument that a corporation could be held liable
for assault and battery); Commonwealth v. Swift Run Gap Turnpike Co., 2 Va. Cap.
362 (1823)(no indictment would lie for misfeasance in obstructing a highway).
69 Susquehannah & Bath Turnpike Co. v. People, 15 Wend. 267, 268 (N.Y. 1836).
70 Mass. St. 1804, Ch. 125, cited in Commonwealth v. Free Bridge Corp. 68 Mass.
[Vol. 65
CORPORATIONS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
The earliest cases in which corporate criminal liability was
considered involved either incorporated municipalities or com-
panies chartered to provide and maintain public thorough-
fares. In such cases the criminal offense was characterized as
nonfeasance since the corporate entity had failed to perform
some function or maintain a standard commanded by common
law or statute. This same distinction had been made by the
English courts first recognizing corporate responsibility for
criminal acts.7 Our courts apparently adopted the nonfea-
sance-misfeasance dichotomy, as legal commentators writing
in the 1850's noted that corporations were indictable only for
nonfeasance.72 For example, in State v. Great Works Milling
& Manufacturing Co.," the court overturned the conviction
of a corporation charged with a nuisance in the erection of a
dam across the Penobscot River, on grounds that a corporation
"can neither commit a crime or misdemeanor, by any positive
or affirmative act, or incite others to do so, as a corporation."74
The court did recognize, however, that,
quasi corporations are indictable for the neglect of duties
imposed by law. Towns for instance, charged with the main-
tenance of the public highways, are by statute indictable, for
any failure of duty in this respect."
The distinction between nonfeasance and misfeasance ac-
cepted by the court in Great Works Milling & Manufacturing
Co. was abandoned some 10 years later in State v. Morris &
Essex Railroad Co.76 and finally put to rest in the Massachu-
58, 68 (1854). The court upheld an indictment for failure of the corporation to maintain
the road in good repair. See E. DODD, AMERicAN BusINEss CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860,
at 346-47 (1954).
n See text accompanying notes 48 and 49, supra.
7' See, e.g., the first edition of Bishop's COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW
published in 1856 which found it "universally admitted" that corporations are indict-
able for nonfeasance. 1 BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CmMINAL LAW, § 308, (1st ed.
1856).
n 20 Me. 41 (1841).
14 Id. at 43. As late as 1864, the Supreme Court of Indiana commented: "Whatever
may be the law in England and in those states in which the common law as to crimes
is recognized, in this state, under the criminal law, a corporation cannot be prosecuted
by information or otherwise for a misfeasance." State v. Ohio & Miss. R.R., 23 Ind.
362, 365 (1864), citing with approval State v. Great Works Milling and Mfg. Co., 20
Me. 41 (1841).
11 20 Me. at 46 (1841).
7- 23 N.J.L. 360 (1852).
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setts case of Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford
Bridge" decided in 1854.
In State v. Morris & Essex Railroad Co., a railroad corpo-
ration was indicted for erecting and maintaining a building
upon a public highway which obstructed the use of the highway
and created a public nuisance. The question confronted di-
rectly in Morris & Essex was whether corporate criminal liabil-
ity would be extended from neglect of duty or nonfeasance to
positive and affirmative acts constituting a misfeasance. The
court considered the conflict between State v. Great Works
Milling & Manufacturing Co., holding that a corporation
could not be indicted for criminal conduct consisting of an
affirmative act, and the 1846 English case of Queen v. Great
North of England Railroad Co.,"5 in which the court had upheld
a corporation's indictment for misfeasance. The court rejected
the corporation's position and found it guilty of creating a pub-
lic nuisance."
In Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New Bedford Bridge,8"
the corporation was indicted for a nuisance resulting from the
erection and maintenance of a bridge, Justice Bigelow rejecting
the corporate defendant's contention that a corporation was
liable for nonfeasance, but not misfeasance, and writing:
that the distinction between a nonfeasance and a misfeasance
is often one more of form than of substance. There are cases
where it would be difficult to say whether the offense consis-
ted in the doing of an unlawful act, or in the doing of a lawful
act in an improper manner. In the case at bar it would be no
great refinement to say, that the defendants are indicted for
not constructing their draws in a suitable manner, and
68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339 (1854).
,8 9 Q.B. 315 (1846).
7 The Court reviewed Blackstone's statement of the English common law and
"conceded that a corporation cannot, from its nature, be guilty of treason, felony, or
other crime involving malus animus in its commission; it is believed that there is no
authority, ancient or modem, which denies the liability of a corporation aggregate to
indictment, except an anonymous case said to have been decided by Chief Justice
Holt, in the Court of King's Bench, in the 13 Will. 3 (1701)." 23 N.J.L. at 364.
Chief Justice Green expressed some doubt as to the accuracy of the rule emanating
from the reported opinion of Chief Justice Holt. This doubt was premised on the fact
that Chief Justice Holt had before him on the King's Bench cases of indictments
"against quasi corporations for neglect to repair roads and bridges," and the reported
rule would appear to be in conflict with the Justice's decisions in those cases. Id.
" 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 339 (1854).
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thereby obstructing navigation which would be a nonfeas-
ance, and not for unlawfully placing obstructions in the river,
which would be a misfeasance. The difficulty in distinguish-
ing the character of these offenses strongly illustrates the
absurdity of the doctrine that a corporation is indictable for
a nonfeasance, but not for a misfeasance.8 '
Although criminal liability had been imposed on corpora-
tions prior to 1859, it was not until State v. Morris & Essex
Railroad Co. in 1852 and Commonwealth v. Proprietors of New
Bedford Bridge in 1854 that corporations were fully subject to
criminal sanctions for acts resulting in a public nuisance with-
out regard to the nonfeasance/misfeasance distinction.
The extension of corporate criminal liability to corporate
misfeasance did not, however, establish corporations as indi-
viduals for all purposes of the criminal law. Following the Eng-
lish pattern the early decisions imposing criminal liability for
misfeasance expressly declined in dicta to impose liability on
corporations for crimes requiring intent. 2
During the period 1850-1875, the courts followed dicta
pronounced in Morris & Essex Railroad Co., and Proprietors of
New Bedford Bridge, and did not generally extend corporate
criminal liability to crimes which required mens rea.s3 Courts
limited the application of liability to offenses which did not
require knowledge or intent of the actor. 4 The explanation for
, Id. at 346.
For example, in State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. 360, 370 (1852) the
court indicated that corporations are not "liable for any crime of which a corrupt intent
or malus animus is an essential ingredient." Similarly, Commonwealth v. Proprietors
of New Bedford Bridge, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) at 345 (1854) held that "[c]orporations
cannot be indicted for offenses which derive their criminality from evil intention, or
which consist in a violation of those social duties which appertain to men and sub-
jects."
' Cf. Cumberland & Oxford Canal Corp. v. Portland, 56 Me. 77 (1868).
" The treatise writers confirm that corporate criminal liability throughout most
of the 19th Century was limited to crimes which did not require a specific intent. The
1885 edition of Wharton's treatise on criminal law states that the view expressed by
Lord Holt on the immunity of corporations from criminal indictment would still apply
to cases of malicious wrongs. 1 F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 91 (9th
ed. 1885). Morawetz, a commentator on the law of corporations writing in 1886, noted
that public policy:
does not demand that a person or association should be punished by the
State, through criminal proceedings, on account of a wrong committed by
another. This would be contrary to the national sense of justice. Hence it is
held that where the commission of a crime involves the intention of the
19761
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this limitation lies in the nature of the cases which had pre-
viously been before the courts. Early cases considering the
question of criminal liability for corporations were primarily
confined to public nuisance,85 and the violation of regulatory
type statutes.8 6 Regulatory statutes created offenses which were
similar to public nuisance in at least two respects. First, crimi-
nal intent was not required to establish a violation, and second,
the statutes proscribed conduct which if engaged in by corpo-
rate actors would result in public harm. The rationale for
applying criminal sanctions to corporations in the case of pub-
lic nuisance was simply to abate the nuisance;87 in the case of
regulatory statutes it was to prevent public harm without re-
gard to the actor's intent in committing the violation.
The courts continued to struggle with the problem of cor-
porate criminal liability for specific intent crimes, but during
the period 1875-1910 both state and federal courts imposed
criminal liability on corporations for crimes requiring a specific
intent.8 Although even today there are lingering suggestions
that crimes involving specific or malicious intent may not be
imputed to corporations, the clear majority of cases have up-
held liability. 9
offender, this intention cannot be imputed to means of a fiction; actual
intention is required.
It follows, therefore, that a corporation cannot be charged criminally
with a crime involving malice, or the intention of the offender.
2 V. MoRAwETz, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 732, (2d ed. 1886).
11 On the historical development of the law of public nuisance, see Brenner,
Nuisance Law and the Industrial Revolution, 3 J. OF LEGAL STuDiES 403 (1974).
See, e.g., People v. Clark, 14 N.Y.S. 642 (1891).
' "The principal object of an indictment for a nuisance, is to compel it to be
abated. . . ." State v. Morris & Essex R.R., 23 N.J.L. at 370 (1852).
"See, e.g., United States v. Union Supply Co., 215 U.S. 51 (1909); United States
v. Young & Holland Co., 170 F. 110 (C.C. R.I. 1909); United States v. New York Herald
Co., 159 F. 296 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1907) (knowingly depositing in the United States mails
certain unmailable matter); United States v. MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1906)(criminal conspiracy under Sherman Anti-Trust Act); United
States v. John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304 (N.D. Cal. 1898) (conspiracy); Telegram Newspaper
Co. v. Commonwealth, 52 N.E. 445 (Mass. 1899) (contempt); State v. White, 69 S.W.
684 (Mo. App. 1902)(unlawfully and knowingly obstructing a road); State v. Atchin-
son, 3 Lea 729 (Tenn. 1879)(criminal libel).
, See 19 AM. Jur. 2D CORPORATION § 1435 (1965).
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1. Corporate Liability for Torts: Influence on the
Development of Criminal Liability of Corporations
The historical development of corporate criminal liability
has been substantially influenced by parallel developments in
the civil law applicable to corporations. The historical develop-
ment of broad tort liability of corporations has found expres-
sion in court decisions resolving similar issues concerning the
scope of liability of corporations for criminal acts of corporate
employees.
It was not uncommon for the early federal court decisions
to rationalize the imposition of corporate criminal liability on
the basis of civil law principles. Tort law principles were explic-
itly recognized by the Supreme Court in New York Central &
Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States,"0 one of the early
American cases applying the fully developed doctrine of corpo-
rate criminal liability. The Supreme Court, in construing a
statute imposing criminal liability on corporations for acts of
its agents in making illegal rebates, reviewed applied principles
of civil liability of corporations for torts. The evolution of the
doctrine of corporate criminal liability cannot be effectively
divorced from the development of theories of corporate respon-
sibility for torts committed by those employed to carry on the
business of the corporation."
2. Legislative Influences on the Growth of
Corporate Criminal Liability
While the expansion of corporate criminal liability was
based in part on tort principles," its growth was also influenced
by trends in legislation. Contemporaneous with the first cases
establishing corporate criminal liability in England in the mid-
1850's, a class of criminal offenses appeared which were pun-
ishable without regard to the guilty intent of the actor.13 The
N 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
, Mueller, supra note 62, at 39; See LEIGH, supra note 43, at 22. There has been
some criticism of the reliance upon the analogy of vicarious liability for torts as a
principle for imposition of criminal responsibility on corporations. See H. BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS § 114 (rev. ed. 1946); Francis, Criminal Responsibility of the
Corporation, 18 ILL. L. Rzv. 305, 316 (1924).
," It is not uncommon for modem courts to rationalize the imposition of corporate
criminal liability on the basis of tort concepts. See, e.g., Egan v. United States, 137
F.2d 369, 379 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943).
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"public-welfare offense" imposed a type of strict liability on
offenders regardless of the actor's intent to perform the pro-
scribed act. The absence of a required intent made the offense
conceptually easier to apply to corporations. The appearance
of strict liability or "public-welfare offenses" and changing
concepts of mens rea applicable to traditional criminal offen-
ses"4 have aided in the progressive imposition of greater crimi-
nal liability on corporations.
The first statutory provisions imposing criminal liability
on corporations in the United States were in statutes enacted
prior to 1900, which created standards of care for corporations
operating railroads.'5 Liability was soon expanded to the gen-
eral class of regulatory statutes which create what has been
referred to as "public-welfare offenses." 6 All of these offenses
were malum prohibitum in that the crime consisted simply of
doing some act prohibited by the statute. Corporate criminal
liability was thus based not only on public policy but the legis-
lative intent expressed in the statute.
Today, both state and federal criminal law are statutory
in origin. Thus, courts called upon to impose corporate crimi-
nal liability will generally consider as a threshold question
11 See Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 56-59 (1933); LEIGH,
supra note 43, at 21-22.
'1 See generally Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REv. 974 (1932); Sayre, The Present
Significance of Mens Rea in the Criminal Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 339, 413 (R.
Pound ed. 1934); Seney, The Sibyl at Cumae-Our Criminal Law's Moral
Obsolescence, 17 WAYNE L. Rnv. 777, 810-23 (1971); Wasserstrom, Strict Liability in
the Criminal Law, 12 STAN. L. REV. 731 (1959).
The decisions permitting convictions of light police offenses without
proof of a guilty mind came just at the time when the demands of an in-
creasingly complex social order required additional regulation of an
administrative character unrelated to questions of personal guilt; the move-
ment also synchronized with the trend of the day away from nineteenth
century individualism toward a new sense of the importance of collective
interests.
Sayre, Public Welfare Offense, 33 COLUM. L. REv. 55, 67 (1933).
,1 1 F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 116 (l1th ed. 1912). In one of the
early cases a railroad corporation was indicted for negligence and misconduct of its
servants in causing a passenger's death in violation of a penal statute applicable to
corporations. Boston, Concord & Montreal v. State, 32 N.H. 215 (1855). The court
upheld the power of the legislature to regulate the rights and duties of a railroad
corporation by providing "a new mode of enforcing the admitted duty of these bodies
to conduct their business with such care and prudence as not to endanger the lives and
limbs of those whom they undertake to transport. .. " Id. at 225-26.
38 Sayre, supra note 93.
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whether the statute which creates the offense charged contem-
plates corporate wrongdoing. The criminal statute involved
may, by its terms, expressly apply to corporations" and in such
cases the courts have little difficulty in imposing liability. 8
The Supreme Court has specifically upheld the constitu-
tionality of statutes requiring imputation of an agent's acts to
the corporation." Today, there appear to be no constitutional
impediments to statutes which attempt to impose criminal lia-
bility directly on a corporation for acts or omissions of its
agents within the scope of their employment. '
The imposition of criminal liability on corporations has
not, however, been limited by the courts to those instances in
which the statute by express provision applies to corporations.
Statutes are commonly directed not at corporations but rather
to "any person" or "whoever" performs or fails to perform cer-
tain acts. These statutes which do not by their terms expressly
provide for corporate liability have been construed by the
courts as imposing criminal liability on corporations. 0'
"7 The United States Code expressly provides:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress unless the context indi-
cates otherwise . . . .the words "person" and "whoever" include corpora-
tions, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies,
as well as individuals ....
1 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). For an extensive listing and classification of federal statutes under
which corporations may be held criminally liable, see Appendix A to Staff Memoranda
on Responsibility for Crimes Involving Corporations and Other Artificial Entities, §§
402-406, in WORKING PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws 163, 207 (July, 1970).
"1 See, e.g., State v. Adjustment Dep't Credit Bureau, Inc., 483 P.2d 687, 691
(Idaho 1971) (rev'd on other grounds) where the court imposed criminal liability on
the corporation based on a general statutory provision which permitted an interpreta-
tion that the word "person" in a criminal extortion provision included corporations as
well as natural persons.
"New York Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909).
N United States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121, 125-126 (1958); cf. United
States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239 (1938).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000, 1004-07 (9th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973), where the court held that a corporation is
liable under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act for the acts of agents in the scope of their
employment notwithstanding the absence of any express intent to impose criminal
liability on corporations.
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III. THE SCOPE OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF
SUBORDINATE LEVEL EMPLOYEES
The criminal liability of corporations is theoretically based
on imputing the acts and intent of members of the corporation
to the corporation itself. The scope of corporate criminal liabil-
ity will therefore depend in large part upon which individual
criminal acts will be imputed or ascribed to the corporate ent-
ity. Two questions are raised. First, which members of the
corporate hierarchy will have their acts imputed to the corpora-
tion, and second, whether the criminal intent of the actor will
be imputed to the same extent as the act itself.
A. Status of the Actor in the Corporate Hierarchy
The most crucial determinant of the scope of corporate
criminal liability is defining the individuals within the corpo-
rate structure who may subject the corporation to criminal
liability. For purposes of delineating the scope of liability, the
members of a corporation can be divided into essentially three
groups. At the highest level, the corporation is governed by a
board of directors and designated corporate officers who formu-
late corporate policy and run the corporation. At the middle
level of the corporate hierarchy are individuals in a supervisory
or managerial capacity who, by virtue of their position, are
involved to a lesser extent with corporate decision-making. The
combination of these two groups, the corporate officers and
high managerial agents, have been referred to as the "inner-
circle" of the corporation.0 - The lowest level in the corporate
hierarchy is composed of subordinate employees and agents of
the corporation who are responsible generally for carrying out
the corporate business and executing the various policies for-
mulated by the "inner-circle."
1. Officers
The corporation is often closely identified with its corpo-
rate officers, and in the case of relatively small corporations,
the corporate entity may be comprised of little more than its
officers. Regardless of whether we are dealing with a small,
102 See Mueller, supra note 62.
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closely held, or a publicly held corporation, the position and
duty of the corporate officers is such that officers who commit
criminal acts within the scope of their employment will most
surely subject the corporation to liability. In United States v.
Empire Packing Co., 03 the corporation and its president were
indicted on 23 counts of filing false claims for government sub-
sidies. The court upheld the imposition of criminal liability on
the corporation based on its president's illegal acts. The court
found that the corporation president
acted not as an individual, but in the role of president and
representative of the corporation within the scope of his cor-
porate capacity both actual and apparent. His illegal activi-
ties were carried on as an incident to the carrying on of the
corporation's business and were made possible only through
the corporate authority with which he was clothed.' 4
The criminal liability of a corporation for the illegal acts
of its officers is not limited, however, to a pattern of illegal
conduct by the corporate president as was the case in Empire
Packing. In United States v. Carter,'"5 two corporations and
two corporate officers were charged with a violation of a provi-
sion of the Taft-Hartley Act which prohibited employers in
industries affecting interstate commerce from paying any
money to an official of a union representing its employees. The
corporate defendants in Carter were charged with a criminal
violation of the Taft-Hartley Act as a result of a single instance
of alleged payment of money in violation of the statute. The
court held that the corporation could be held criminally liable
for the isolated act of the corporation president since "the au-
thority of . . . [a corporation president] and the activity in
which he was engaged at the time of the offense involved,
brought criminal responsibility to the corporation of which he
was president."'' 5 The court noted that Carter was the chief
officer with the general supervisory authority that attends such
an office and "was, in fact, the one who ran the company."'
0 7
Thus, the corporate president's single illegal payment in Carter
'' 174 F.2d 16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949).
,o Id. at 20.
'8 311 F.2d at 934 (6th Cir. 1963).
,' Id. at 942.
Wt Id.
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was imputed to the company for the purpose of imposing crimi-
nal liability in the same manner that Empire Packing was held
responsible for 22 instances of false claims made by its corpo-
rate president.
There is a tendency to treat officers as an extension of the
corporate entity and to characterize the criminal acts of corpo-
rate officers as the acts of the corporation.1 8 The special posi-
tion of corporate officers in the corporate hierarchy results in
the imposition of a form of primary liability,' 9 which can be
defined as the liability imposed on the corporation for the crim-
inal conduct of individuals sufficiently high in the corporation
to be considered the "alter ego" of the corporate enterprise.
2. Managers and Supervisors
The scope of corporate criminal liability has extended
downward through the corporate hierarchy to the middle-level
management and supervisory level."' In United States v. Ar-
mour & Co., '" a corporation was charged with violating regula-
tions prohibiting tie-in sales under the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act of 1942. The alleged violations resulted from the acts
of managers, assistant managers and salesmen of the defen-
dant corporation, and the court affirmed that a corporation can
be held criminally liable for the acts of such middle-level man-
agement personnel.
,O See Hitchler, The Criminal Responsibility of Corporations, 27 DICK. L. REV.
121, 126 (1923); Comment, 27 HARv. L. REv. 589 (1914).
"I See generally Fisse, The Distinction between Primary and Vicarious Corporate
Criminal Liability, 41 AUST. L. J. 203 (1967).
110 See, e.g., United States v. American Radiation & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433
F.2d 174, 204-05 (3d Cir. 1970)(sales manager-conspiracy to fix prices of plumbing
fixtures); Continental Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137, 148-51 (6th Cir.
1960)(plant manager, depot manager and supervisors-conspiracy to fix prices of bak-
ery products in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act); United States v. Steiner
Plastics Mfg., Co., 231 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1956)(production manager-conspiracy to
falsify and falsification of approval stamps on materials manufactured for Navy);
United States v. Milton Marks Corp., 240 F.2d 838, 839 (3d Cir. 1956)(general fore-
man-knowingly presenting a false claim to the United States); United States v.
Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948)(branch manager and assistant branch
manager-violation of regulations under the Emergency Price Control Act prohibiting
tie-in sales); United States v. VanRiper, 154 F.2d 492, 493 (3d Cir. 1946)(manager of
gas station-violation of regulations established under the War Powers Acts); C.I.T.
Corp. v. United States, 150 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945)(branch manager-conspiracy to
make false credit statement applications to the FHA).
" 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948).
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In CIT Corp. v. United States, 112 the corporate defendant
argued that an area office manager was too low in the corporate
hierarchy to bind the company by causing false credit applica-
tion statements to be made to the Federal Housing Administra-
tion. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the defense
and upheld the criminal conviction of the corporation. The
court found the CIT area office manager to be an authorized
agent for the corporation in carrying out the specific activity
which resulted in criminal conduct, and noted that the man-
ager had, in effect, been delegated the power to create corpo-
rate criminal responsibility on behalf of the corporation. 13
3. Subordinate Employees
We have seen that courts have imputed to the corporation
acts of both corporate officers and middle-level managers in
imposing criminal liability on the corporate entity. The more
difficult question is whether the acts and intent of subordinate
employees and agents acting within the scope of their employ-
ment can be imputed to the corporation to the same degree as
the acts and intent of officers and managers who "run" the
corporation and who are readily identified with the decision
making functions of the corporation. The initial consideration
will concern the imputation of acts only. Because courts have
given special consideration to imputing the intent of subordi-
nate employees to the corporation, that problem will be consid-
ered separately.
a. "Links" Between the Subordinate Employee and
Company Officials in a Management or Supervisory Position
The easiest case for imposing corporate criminal liability
for acts of subordinate employees or agents is where the subor-
dinate employee can be "linked" in some way with a member
of the "inner-circle." In such cases, courts will often cite this
relationship as a basis for imposing liability on the corpora-
tion."' Similarly, the authorization or acquiescence of manag-
112 150 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945).
" Id. at 89.
1 See, e.g., State v. Granziani, 158 A.2d 375 (N.J. App. Div. 1959), where officers'
knowledge of the acts of salesmen was held to be knowledge imputable to the corpora-
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ers in a supervisory capacity who have authority over the mat-
ter involved in the criminal violation may serve as a "link"
between the subordinate employee and the corporation, bind-
ing the corporation for criminal acts of the subordinate actor.
Those courts which look for the authorization or acquiesc-
ence "link" between the subordinate employee and the "inner-
circle" may uphold corporate criminal liability for acts of sub-
ordinate employees performed methodically and continuously,
thereby permitting an inference of authorization or acquiesc-
ence by corporate officers and supervisory personnel.115 The
rationale of courts in the authorization and acquiescence cases
is frequently based on tort concepts of principal-agent. That is,
whenever a principal of the corporation, either an officer or
supervisory manager, authorizes an employee's act, then the
corporation itself can be said to have acted through the agent.
The inquiry by courts into whether the criminal acts of the
subordinate employee were authorized or acquiesced in by a
responsible company official raises a question of whether this
attempt to "link" the subordinate employee with someone
higher in the corporate hierarchy operates as a substantial limi-
tation in the application of corporate criminal liability. The
following sections explore those cases in which the evidence
before the court has not established a direct relationship be-
tion for purposes of establishing criminal liability. See also People v. Raphael, 72
N.Y.S.2d 748, 750 (Magis. Ct. 1947) where the court found that
a corporation is chargeable with the crime of an agent or employee, acting
in the scope of his employment, when: (1) The corporation has benefited or
profited from the crime, or (2) its officers participated in the crime, or (3)
its officers authorized, sanctioned or acquiesced in the commission of the
crime by an agent or employee, or (4) it had knowledge of the crime, or (5)
it was chargeable with negligence in not obtaining such knowledge, through
reasonable inquiry.
"I In State v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 15 W.Va. 362 (1879), it was stated:
It is but a reasonable inference that acts which are habitually done by the
authorized agents of a corporation are done with their approval; and this is
indeed almost the only manner in which the approval by the corporation of
the acts of its agents can ever be proven. The tacit appropriation by a
corporation of the benefits of the acts of its agents, repeatedly occurring, is
full and satisfactory proof of the assent of the corporation to the doing of such
acts.
See People v. Hudson Valley Constr. Co., 111 N.E. 472 (N.Y. 1916); but see People v.
Canadian Fur Trappers Corp., 161 N.E. 455, 456 (N.Y. 1928). See also United States
v. Knox Coal Co., 347 F.2d 33, 40-41 (3d Cir. 1965).
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tween the wrongdoing employee and some member of the
"inner-circle."
b. Direct Imputation from Subordinate Actor to the
Corporation
While the courts may in some cases find evidence of high-
level authorization of criminal acts of subordinate employees,
criminal liability may be imposed in the absence of any "link"
between the subordinate actor and the "inner-circle" of the
corporation. Thus, the second circuit in United States v. Stei-
ner Plastics Manufacturing Co."6 has held that:
[i]n order to prove the corporation guilty it was not neces-
sary for the government to show that an officer or director was
involved in the frauding scheme. It was enough to show that
agents of the corporation acting within the area entrusted to
them had violated the law.
Likewise, in St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States,"
7
the First Circuit found:
it would not be enough to absolve the corporation from liabil-
ity for a criminal offense of the sort here in question, that no
member of the board of directors or no one of the higher
executives knew that a dangerous commodity was being
transported by the company trucks in a forbidden quantity
without markings required by the regulation.
In United States v. George F. Fish, Inc."' the corporate
defendant was held criminally liable for the tie-in sales of a
salesman in violation of the maximum price regulations in ef-
fect during World War II. The court noted that the regulations
were directed to acts which would necessarily be performed by
subordinate employees rather than corporate officers. There-
fore, any distinction between corporate officers and salesmen
would have defeated the purpose of the statute if the acts of
the employee salesmen were not imputed to the corporation for
purposes of imposing liability. The public policy advanced in
securing compliance with the regulations dictated that the
court impose liability on the corporation.
"' See United States v. Steiner Plastics Mfg. Co., 231 F.2d 149, 151 (2d Cir. 1956).
117 220 F.2d 393, 398 (1st Cir. 1955).
"A 154 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946).
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The courts in St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., George F. Fish,
Inc., and Steiner Plastics unanimously adopted the view that
a corporation may be held criminally liable without any show-
ing of a relationship which would "link" the wrongdoing subor-
dinate actor and the "inner-circle" so long as the criminal acts
are performed by agents within the scope of their employment.
In the absence of conduct of corporate officials such as
authorization or acquiescence which would "link" the high-
level corporate officer and the employee, the courts have gen-
erally adopted a "functional" test to determine whether a sub-
ordinate employee's act may result in corporate criminal liabil-
ity. The "functional" test was explicitly articulated in C.I.T.
Corp. v. United States"' where, in determining whether an area
office manager's acts could be imputed to the corporation the
court stated, "[i]t is the function delegated to the corporate
officer or agent which determines his power to engage the cor-
poration in a criminal transaction."
The general rule now established in the federal courts is
that the status of the actor within the corporate hierarchy is not
determinative of whether the individual may bring criminal
sanctions upon the corporation and that no "link" is required
between the subordinate actor and the "inner-circle. 20
c. Imputation of Intent of Subordinate Actors to the
Corporation
The historical growth of the doctrine of corporate criminal
"' 150 F.2d 85, 89 (9th Cir. 1945).
' See, e.g., United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239 (1938); Steere Tank
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1963); Standard Oil Co. of Texas
v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962)(dicta); St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v.
United States, 220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955); United States v. VanRiper, 154 F.2d 492
(3d Cir. 1946); United States v. George F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946); Zito v. United States, 64 F. 2d 772 (7th Cir. 1933); United
States v. E. Brooke Matlack, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 814 (D. Md. 1957). The English courts
have not followed the example of the American courts in imposing corporate criminal
liability on the basis of criminal activity of subordinate actors in the corporate hier-
archy. The English courts impute to the corporation only those acts committed by
actors who occupy a superior position in the corporation structure: "In general, he must
represent the brains of the company. He must be someone of whom the courts can say
that his acts were the acts of the company." LEIGH, supra note 43, at 45. The English
cases with notably few exceptions hold the corporation criminally liable only where the
human actor occupied a high position in the corporate hierarchy, and exercised a
superior executive function.
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liability traced in Section III shows the early restrictions on the
doctrine, one of which involved corporate immunity for crimes
requiring an evil or malicious intent.' 21 Although corporations
from the mid-1830's have been liable for crimes of agents which
did not require intent, that was not true for specific intent
crimes until the beginning of the 20th century. The early courts
were willing to impute the criminal acts of employees and
agents to the corporation only in cases of crimes which did not
require specific intent. The first decisions which imposed cor-
porate criminal liability did so to abate common law nuisances
and secure compliance with regulatory type offenses which did
not require a specific criminal intent for their violation. Beyond
this, however, the courts were faced with conceptual difficul-
ties. While it is relatively easy to conceive of the corporation
acting through subordinate employees, agents, and officers, it
is harder to conceptualize the deriving of the "intent" of a
corporation from its subordinate employees. Because mens rea
required a personal conscience, the courts and writers found it
difficult to conceive of a corporate entity's mens rea. Tradi-
tional concepts of "intent," "willfulness," and "malice" de-
rived from the application of criminal law to individuals are
wholly inappropriate for conceptualizing corporate wrongdo-
ing.
One of the earliest cases which surmounted this obstacle
was Telegram Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth. ,2 There, the
court upheld corporate liability for criminal contempt stating,
[W]e think that a corporation may be liable criminally for
certain offenses of which a specific intent may be a necessary
element. There is no more difficulty in imputing to a corpora-
tion a specific intent in criminal proceedings than in civil.'1
The evolution of corporate criminal liability to encompass
specific intent crimes coupled with the federal courts' disregard
for the status of the corporate actor in determining whether to
212 See text accompanying notes 82-89.
1" 52 N.E. 445 (Mass. 1899).
" Id. at 446. In United States v. McAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823, 836
(S.D.N.Y. 1917), the court found it "as easy and logical to ascribe to a corporation an
evil mind as to impute to it a sense of contractual obligation." See also New York Cent.
& Harbor River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481 (1909); Joplin Mercantile Co. v.
United States, 213 F. 926 (8th Cir. 1914), aff'd, 236 U.S. 531 (1915).
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impose liability on the corporation has resulted in a clear line
of decisions holding corporations criminally liable for specific
intent crimes committed by subordinate employees. 12
1. Minority View: Restriction of Imputation of Intent of
Subordinate Actors
One early case which did not accept the prevailing view
that a subordinate actor's intent may be directly imputed to
the corporation was People v. Canadian Fur Trappers Corp., l2
in which the New York Court held that:
The mere knowledge and intent of the agent or the servant
to steal would not be sufficient in and of itself to make the
corporation guilty. While a corporation may be guilty of lar-
ceny, may be guilty of the intent to steal, the evidence must
go further than in the cases involving solely the violation of
prohibitive statutes. The intent must be the intent of the
corporation and not merely that of the agent. How this intent
may be proved or in what cases it becomes evident depends
entirely upon the circumstance of each case.'
The court in Canadian Fur Trappers limited criminal liability
for specific intent crimes committed by agents and employees
to those authorized by or committed with the acquiescence of
corporate officers.'2
2I United States v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239 (1938); Boise Dodge, Inc. v.
United States, 406 F.2d 771 (9th Cir. 1969); Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States,
330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1963); Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1958);
United States v. Armour & Co. 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948); United States v. George
F. Fish, Inc., 154 F.2d 798 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 869 (1946). See also United
States v. Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc., 464 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1972); Texas-
Oklahoma Express, Inc., v. United States, 429 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1970); Inland Freight
Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1951); United States v. E. Brooke
Matlack, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 814 (D. Md. 1957), and cases cited in Coleman, Is Corpo-
rate Criminal Liability Necessary?, 29 Sw. L.J. 908, 909 n. 10 (1975).
161 N.E. 455 (N.Y. 1928).
" Id. at 456.
22 Gerhardt Mueller, an eminent criminal law professor at New York University,
has made a similar argument. Mueller, supra note 62. He objects to the extension of
corporate criminal liability to acts of subordinate employees on the grounds that only
the "inner-circle" is capable of acting and thinking for the corporation. His argument
that a corporation acts and forms the requisite criminal intent to violate a statute only
through its "inner-circle" has been adopted by other legal writers suggesting limitation
of corporate criminal liability to acts of the "primary representatives," Winn, The
Criminal Responsibility of Corporations, 3 CAMB. L. J. 398, 414 (1928); "superior-
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Acceptance of this minority position would not substan-
tially limit the scope of liability as presently applied by the
courts, since liability would continue to be imposed on the
corporation where a "link" is established with the "inner-
circle". Thus, where it is shown that the corporate officers,
middle-level managers or supervisory personnel had actual or
constructive knowledge of the acts of the subordinate employ-
ees or agents, the court would rely upon the "link" as a basis
of imposing liability on the corporations.
As in the case of authorization, constructive knowledge of
a subordinate actor's criminal activities may be charged where
the criminal acts are an established practice or have become a
course of business. Thus, where the wrongful acts attributed to
the subordinate employees and agents are performed methodi-
cally or continuously over a period of time they may raise a
presumption that the acts were sanctioned or were continued
only with the acquiescence of the corporate "inner-circle." An
established pattern of criminal acts may act as an estoppel of
the corporation in the minority jurisdiction to interpose a de-
fense against corporate liability for imputation of specific in-
tent from the subordinate employee to the corporation. Of
course, the corporation is not legally estopped from asserting
such a defense, but the theory would in effect place a heavy and
perhaps in many instances an insurmountable burden on the
corporation to show that the members of the "inner-circle"
indeed had no knowledge of the wrongdoing.
The minority view expressed in Canadian Fur Trappers
and supported by Professor Mueller '2 is of great significance in
those cases where only a single instance of wrongdoing is
charged. In such cases, the government does not have the ad-
vantages of a presumption of corporate knowledge, authoriza-
agents," Note, Criminal Liability of Corporations for Acts of Their Agents, 60 HARV.
L. REV. 283 (1946); "governing officers," Note, 27 HARv. L. REV. 589 (1914); or
"governing body" of the corporation, Welsh, The Criminal Liability of Corporations,
62 L. Q. REV. 345, 362 (1942).
Professor Seney has offered a counter argument which suggests that "[Biasing
'crime' on mens rea exonerates major harm producers, groups without minds, and
corporations whose profit purpose is praised not stigmatized." Seney, "A Pond as Deep
as Hell"--Harm, Danger, and Dangerousness in our Criminal Law, 18 WAYNE L. REV.
569, 634 (1972).
12 Id.
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tion, or acquiescence and thus has a greater burden in estab-
lishing the "link" with the "inner-circle." In fact the "link"
may be impossible to establish in the absence of a pattern of
wrongdoing. The adoption of this position would not affect the
imposition of criminal liability for the single or isolated acts of
corporate officers but would lessen corporate responsibility for
the random and isolated speciific intent crimes committed by
subordinate employees of the corporation.
2. Purpose to Benefit the Corporation Required to Impute
Intent of Subordinate Employees to the Corporation
The most significant restriction on imputation of a subor-
dinate employee's intent to the corporation is found in
Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States.'29 In that case two
corporations had been convicted for knowingly violating the
Connally Hot Oil Act, which prohibits shipment of contraband
oil in interstate commerce. On appeal the fifth circuit over-
turned the convictions on the grounds that the "corporation
does not acquire that knowledge or possess the requisite 'state
of mind essential for responsibility' through the activities of
unfaithful servants whose conduct was undertaken to advance
the interests of parties other than their corporate employer."' 3
Two years later the fifth circuit again addressed the ques-
tion of whether criminal liability would be imposed on a corpo-
ration for acts of subordinate employees committed solely for
the employees' benefit in Steere Tank Lines, Inc. v. United
States. '3' The court held that a corporation could not
knowingly and willfully violate Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion regulations by filing falsified driver logs where the drivers
who filed the logs were acting for their own benefit. Thus, at
least in the fifth circuit, a subordinate employee must be acting
to "benefit" the corporation when committing the wrongful
acts before the court will impute the employee's intent to the
corporation.'32
The status of the "benefit" rule outside the fifth circuit is
unclear. Courts have generally not required a showing that the
129 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
'" Id. at 129.
'3' 330 F.2d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 1969).
"I Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d at 128.
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corporation received any actual benefit in order to hold the
corporation responsible for the criminal acts of its employees,'
33
so long as the criminal act was not solely to benefit the em-
ployee. 3 The court in Standard Oil would go no further. In
fact, corporate criminal liability may be upheld where the acts
of the subordinate employee are actually detrimental to the
corporation.' 35 In Old Monastery Co. v. United States,13 1 the
fourth circuit declared that "[wie do not accept benefit as a
touchstone of corporate criminal liability; benefit at best, is an
evidential, not an operative fact.' 31 7 It should be noted, how-
ever, that the rejection of the "benefit" theory in Old Monas-
tery Co. came in a case involving a corporate president as op-
posed to a subordinate employee and thus the court was not
called upon to decide the precise issue presented in Standard
Oil and Steere Tank Lines. '
The Model Penal Code contains a limitation on corporate
liability similar to the Standard Oil "benefit" requirement al-
though drafted before the decision in Standard Oil. The Model
Penal Code provision would impose liability on the corporation
for acts of an agent of the corporation "acting within the scope
of his office or employment in behalf of the corporation
... ,"3 The final phrase was added to avoid the imposition
of corporate liability for criminal conduct of employees detri-
mental to the corporation.'
The Model Penal Code requirement of acts "in behalf of
'3 United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1963); United States v. Empire
Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16, 20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949).
'1' The requirement established in Standard Oil that subordinate employees
whose wrongful acts am imputed to the corporation must be acting to "benefit" the
corporation rather than to line their own pockets does not establish a requirement that
the corporation must be actually benefited as a result of the employee's illegal act. The
court in Standard Oil expressly stated that a corporation may be held criminally liable
"even though no benefit has been received in fact" from the illegal acts of the em-
ployee. Thus, rather than a requirement to show benefit to the corporation, Standard
Oil requires nothing more than a showing of "a purpose to benefit."
'1 See Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945).
'3, Id.
'7 Id., cited with approval in United States v. Empire Packing Co., 174 F.2d 16,
20 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 959 (1949).
'l See also United States v. Carter, 311 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 1963).
' MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(a)(Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955) (emphasis added).
"I Id., Comment.
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the corporation" can be construed as defining the required
agency relationship between the actor and the corporation, and
not as requiring that the acts be performed with the intention
of benefiting the corporation."' Under this interpretation, an
act by an agent may be "in behalf of the corporation" as re-
quired by the Model Penal Code even if the act was harmful
to the corporation and was performed for the sole benefit of the
actor. Therefore, the Model Penal Code does not, by this inter-
pretation, support the "benefit" rule enunciated in Standard
Oil, although the drafters may have intended a similar result.
Neither the "benefit rule" of the fifth circuit nor the Model
Penal Code provision would preclude corporate responsibility
for the criminal activities of subordinate employees and agents
acting for their own benefit or the benefit of third parties where
the "inner-circle" can be "linked" to the activities. This result
is suggested by the fifth circuit itself in Steere Tank Lines,"'
in which the court implies that truck drivers who falsify ICC
required driver logs solely for their own benefit may subject the
corporation to criminal liability for such acts where other cor-
porate agents had knowledge of the violations.'
Standard Oil and the Model Penal Code implicitly recog-
nize, however, that certain acts of subordinate employees
within the scope of their employment cannot realistically be
viewed as emanating from the corporation itself. This attempt
to limit the imposition of corporate criminal liability is remi-
niscent of the early view that certain crimes involving mali-
cious or evil intent were so ultra vires that the corporation
could not commit them. The limitation posed by the Model
Penal Code is not as restrictive as the early ultra vires doctrine,
but is certainly a partial return to that view.
3. Limitations on Imputation of Intent of Subordinate Actors
for Commission of Common Law Crimes
At least one court which imputed criminal acts of subordi-
nate employees directly to the corporation for the purpose of
establishing corporate criminal liability for a substantive crime
" Such an interpretation was suggested in Hamilton, Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity in Texas, 47 TEx. L. REv. 60, 79 (1968).
142 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1969).
"' Id. at 723, 724.
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acquitted the corporation on the conspiracy counts. In United
States v. Thompson-Powell Drilling Co.,' the Government
had indicted the corporation for a conspiracy based on an ille-
gal agreement of subordinate employees which the govern-
ment argued could be imputed to the corporation for purposes
of establishing a conspiracy by the corporation. The court,
however, distinguished the conspiracy and the substantive of-
fense and questioned "whether the fact that the corporate em-
ployee may have acted in concert with other individuals in the
commission of the substantive offense will similarly by imputa-
tion implicate the corporation in the conspiracy."'45 The court
viewed the imputation necessary for a conspiracy "a step re-
moved from the imputation of the substantive offense" and
held that "the assent of some agent in supervisory or executive
authority would be necessary to commit a corporation to con-
spiracy." 1'
The Thompson-Powell decision has been supported on the
grounds that there is a valid distinction between codified com-
mon law crimes requiring specific intent and more recent statu-
tory offenses of a regulatory nature which are designed to pre-
vent harm to the general public."' The distinction is premised
on the belief that a corporation's violation of statutes proscrib-
ing common law fraud and conspiracy do not directly inflict
harm upon the general public as do corporate violations of pure
statutory offenses.' Absent a legislative purpose of preventing
direct harm to the public, it is contended that the courts should
not look beyond corporate management in deriving the
"intent" of the corporation to commit the crime of fraud or
conspiracy." 9 Under this theory the nature of the crime, rather
"1 196 F. Supp. 571 (N.D. Tex. 1961), rev'd on other grounds sub. noma.; Standard
Oil Company of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1962).
"I Id. at 578.
149 Id.
", Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Acts in Violation of Company Policy,
50 GEo. L.J. 547, 561 (1962).
"' Id. at 562.
", Id. This view would allow the courts to impute the intent of subordinate actors
to the corporation for violations of purely statutory offenses committed within the
scope of their employment, regardless of knowledge, authorization, or acquiescence of
the "inner-circle." However, violations of statutory common law crimes which require
mens rea would not be imputed to the corporation on the basis of the agency relation-
ship alone.
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than the status or function of the employee, restricts the impu-
tation of intent.1
50
This approach was adopted in State v. Adjustment De-
partment Credit Bureau, Inc.,'-" in which the Supreme Court
of Idaho cited the statutory common law crimes/regulatory
offenses distinction in reversing a corporate defendant's convic-
tion for extortion. The court found that the extortion statute
was a codification of the common law crime of extortion and
black-mail which required a specific intent for conviction.
The distinction between purely statutory offenses and the
common law crimes codified by statute raises a question of the
extent to which the federal crime of common law conspiracy,
now codified at 18 U.S.C. 371 (1970), can be imputed to a
corporation based on the criminal acts of subordinate actors in
the corporate hierarchy. From an early date corporations have
been subject to indictment for the crime of conspiracy, 52 and
as in the case of substantive crimes involving corporate officers,
criminal liability for conspiracy has been imposed on the corpo-
ration based on the criminal intent of the officers.'53
Although corporate conspiracies based on acts of subordi-
"I The most serious objection to this argument is the recognition that "whether
or not the crime has been reduced to statutory form has no logical bearing upon
whether or not the crime requires proof of a guilty mind. Innumerable statutory crimes
require mens rea and the necessity of mens rea may be as readily dispensed with the
case of common law offenses as statutory ones." Sayre, supra note 93, at 70.
151 483 P.2d 687 (Idaho 1971).
"5 See, e.g., State v. Eastern Coal Co., 70 A. 1, 7 (R.I. 1908) in which the corporate
defendant was charged with a conspiracy to fix the price of coal. The court held that
"[i]f corporations have the capacity to engage in actionable conspiracy, they have the
power to criminally conspire. We are of the opinion that the better reasoning supports
the contention that corporations can conspire . . ." See also United States v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Co., 149 F. 823 (S.D.N.Y. 1906). See generally Hermann,
Conspiracy, The Business Enterprise, White Collar Crime and Federal Prosecution: A
Primer for Practice, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 476 (1976).
I" Old Monastery Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 905 (4th Cir. 1945) (conspiracy
to violate the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942) (acts of a corporation president);
Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943) (conspiracy of a registered public
utility holding company to make political contributions in violation of § 12(h) of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1970)) (acts of president);
Mininsohn v. United States, 101 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939) (conspiracy to defraud the
United States by obtaining the payment of false and fraudulent claims)(acts of
"controlling" officers); United States v. Kemmel, 160 F.Supp. 718 (M.D. Penn.
1958)(conspiracy to defraud the United States by applying less paint than provided
for in corporation's subcontract for painting buildings at military installation)(acts of
corporation president and job superintendent).
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nate employees have arisen infrequently, and there is some
doubt created by the Thompson-Powell decision, courts have
generally upheld corporate liability for conspiracies based on
acts of subordinate employees and agents.'54
In Zito v. United States,'55 for example, a' corporation was
charged with entering into an unlawful conspiracy for the pur-
pose of violating the National Prohibition Act. The court, in
determining whether the corporation was a member of the al-
leged conspiracy, looked to the "act," "speech" and "conduct
of the actors" since "corporations speak and act through their
agents." '56 The court then held that the determination of
whether the corporation was a member of a conspiracy was for
the jury where the proof showed that an agent with authority
to sell a corporation's products entered an illegal conspiracy in
the course of business.
15 7
Although the court in Zito allowed the imposition of corpo-
rate criminal liability for a conspiracy entered by a salesman,
this decision, standing alone, does not support the proposition
that a subordinate employee's acts will always subject the cor-
poration to such liability. In Zito, the court noted that "other
individuals connected with" the corporation could have been
included in the indictment,' 6 and found, in addition to the
actions of the salesman, other corporate actions which sug-
gested that the corporation was a part of the conspiracy. These
considerations cast some doubt on whether the agent's activi-
ties in the conspiracy, without more, would have prompted the
court to reach the same result.
I" See, e.g., C.I.T. Corp. v. United States, 150 F.2d 85 (9th Cir. 1945) (conspiracy
to make and pass false statements to the Federal Housing Administration)(acts of
branch manager); Zito v. United States, 64 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1933) (conspiracy to
violate the National Prohibition Act)(acts of an agent, salesman); United States v.
Uniroyal, Inc., 300 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)(conspiracy to fix prices of rubbersoled
canvas footwear in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970))
(acts of salesmen and branch managers).
' 64 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1933).
,' Id. at 775.
,5 The scope of the agent's duties and exact position in the corporate hierarchy
are not set forth in the opinion.
1- 64 F.2d at 775.
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IV. CORPORATE DEFENSES TO IMPOSITION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
FOR ACTS OF SUBORDINATE EMPLOYEES
A. Lack of Knowledge by Corporate Officers
One defense raised by corporations to the imposition of
criminal liability based on acts of subordinate employees is
that the corporation, through its corporate officers and supervi-
sory personnel, not only did not participate in the wrongdoing
charged to the corporation, but had no knowledge of the activi-
ties of the employee sought to be imputed to the corporation.' 5
In holding a partnership entity liable for "knowingly" violating
ICC regulations for safe transportation of explosives, the Su-
preme Court in United States v. A & P Trucking Co.' stated
that business entities can be guilty of "knowing" violations of
regulatory statutes. The court observed that
[t]he business entity cannot be left free to break the law
merely because its owners. . . do not personally participate
in the infraction. The treasury of the business may not with
impunity obtain the fruits of violations which are committed
knowingly by agents of the entity in the scope of their em-
ployment.''
A defense by the corporation that its officers lacked knowl-
edge of the subordinate employee's wrongdoing goes to the very
heart of the doctrine of corporate criminal liability since the
corporation can gain knowledge only by way of some human
actor within the corporation. Thus, if the knowledge of subordi-
nate employees'6 2 could not be imputed directly to the corpora-
' See, e.g., Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1958); United
States v. E. Brooke Matlack, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 814, 820 (D. Md. 1957); cf. United
States v. A & P Trucking Co., 358 U.S. 121 (1958). For a general discussion of defenses
to the imposition of liability for the acts of subordinates, see Note, Corporate Criminal
Liability for Acts in Violation of Company Policy, 50 GEo. L.J. 547 (1962).
t6 358 U.S. 121 (1958).
,' Id. at 126.
,, The knowledge imputed to the corporation may not be limited to that of a
single employee but may be derived from the collective knowledge of several employ-
ees. See, e.g., Inland Freight Lines v. United States, 191 F.2d 313, 315 (10th Cir.
1951)(rev'd on other grounds) where the corporate defendant contended that the corpo-
ration, a motor common carrier, was not criminally liable for falsifications of its drivers
in the preparation of logs required by the ICC unless it had actual knowledge of the
falsifications. The corporate defendant was able to show that the logs and reports
containing the falsifications were not seen by a single agent or representative of the
company after they were filed and that no single agent or representative had actual
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tion, the scope of corporate criminal liability would be severely
restricted. The federal courts have not generally restricted im-
putation by requiring knowledge of corporate officers, manag-
ers, or supervisors. Rather "it is usually held to be enough to
charge the corporation with guilt if any agent or servant of the
corporation, acting for the corporation in the scope of his em-
ployment, has the guilty knowledge, in accordance with the
general principles of the law of agency as applied in determin-
ing civil liability.'
61 3
B. Scope of Employment
The primary limitation on corporate criminal liability is
the traditional requirement adopted from the tort concept of
respondeat superior that acts be committed by employees and
agents within the scope of their employment in order to impose
sanctions upon the corporation. Courts have, however, rarely
discussed the scope of employment in the criminal context.'64
Although the phrase has generated a substantial volume of
litigation in the torts area, it has not been a source of major
dispute in corporate criminal liability decisions since corporate
wrongdoing generally involves regulatory offenses in which
there is no real question of the employees' conduct being within
the scope of employment. 5
knowledge of the false statements. The court held that the knowledge required to
impose criminal liability on the corporation may be imputed from more than one agent
where the knowledge of any single agent was insufficient.
See also Riss & Co. v. United States, 262 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1958); United States
v. T.I.M.E.-D.C. Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730, 738-39 (W.D. Va. 1974) citing Steere Tank
Lines, Inc. v. United States, 330 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Sawyer
Transport, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 29 (D. Minn. 1971); Inland Freight Lines v. United
States, 161 N. E. 455 (N.Y. 1928).
"I St. Johnsbury Trucking Co. v. United States, 220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955); Cf.
Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 158 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1946).
' See cases cited in Coleman, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Really Necessary?
29 Sw. L.J. 908, 910 n. 11 (1975).
I" The scope of employment limitation on corporate criminal liability would ap-
parently limit the corporation's responsibility for crimes such as bigamy, perjury, rape
and murder. See Rex v. Cory Brothers & Co., 1 K.B. 810 (1927); New York Cent. &
Harbor River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909); United States v. John
Kelso Co., 86 F. 304, 306 (N.D. Cal. 1898); State v. First Nat'l Bank, 51 N.W. 587 (S.D.
1892), writ of error dismissed, 163 U.S. 686 (1896). In surveying the case law of corpo-
rate criminal liability the drafters of the Model Penal Code found no case in which a
corporation was sought to be held criminally liable for such crimes as murder, treason,
rape or bigamy. MODEL PENAL CODE, § 2.07, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 4. (1955). But
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Corporations have advanced a number of defenses related
to the scope of employment limitation. First, they question
whether an employee or agent who commits an illegal act can
ever be acting within the scope of employment where the corpo-
ration, through its officers, has not sought to engage in criminal
activity. This argument resembles the old doctrine of ultra
vires, which would, if literally applied, absolve the corporation
of all criminal acts.'
66
The "fiction" theory of corporate existence'67 which pre-
vailed in the last century, asserted that
since a corporation is only a fictitious person created and
invested with certain functions by the state, it was capable
of doing only acts expressly permitted in its charter; that
anything further, being ultra vires, was not the act of the
corporation; and hence there would be no corporate liability
for torts or crimes.1 68
Modern courts with no allegiance to the "fiction" theory of
corporate existence, and recognizing the restrictive role of ultra
vires in tort law, have not employed the ultra vires doctrine to
restrict the imposition of criminal liability:'69
see People v. Rochester Ry. & Light Co., 88 N.E. 22 (N.Y. 1909), in which a corporation
was indicted for second degree manslaughter. Before reaching the dispositive question
as to whether the statutory provision for manslaughter would impose criminal liability
on the corporation, the court reviewed the more general question of whether a corpora-
tion was capable of committing the crime. The court concluded that a corporation
could be held criminally liable for manslaughter although such liability would not be
imposed in the case before the court since the definition of manslaughter in the statute
precluded the commission of the offense by a corporation.
"I See, e.g., United States v. Alaska Packers Ass'n, 1 Alas. 219 (1901); Music Box,
Inc. v. Miller, 121 So. 196 (La. App. 1929); State v. Great Works, Milling and Mfg.
Co., 20 Me.41 (1841); Commonwealth v. Punxutawney St. Pas. R.R., 24 Pa. Co. Ct.
25 (1901). See also Note, Criminal Liability of Corporations, 14 CoLuM. L. REv. 241
(1914).
" See generally Hohfeld, Nature of Stockholders'Individual Liability For Corpo-
rate Debts, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 285 (1909); Machen, Corporate Personality, 24 HARv. L.
REV. 253, 347 (1911).
" Note, The Criminal Liability of Corporations, 20 HARV. L. REV. 321, 321-22
(1907).
"I See Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943); Mininsohn v. United
States, 101 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939); United States v. Mirror Lake Golf and Country
Club., Inc., 232 F. Supp. 167, 172 (W.D. Mo. 1964).
The position of the English courts regarding the ultra vires limitation is unclear.
See LEIGH, supra note 43, at 48.
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The ultra vires doctrine has often been invoked by corpora-
tions as a defense to prosecutions, with an increasing lack of
success. While crime is always an ultra vires act, this does not
relieve the corporation from responsibility for such crimes if
committed in the course of intra vires business, or even in the
course of an ultra vires business if the servant committing the
crime was acting within the scope of his authority. 70
It is obvious that a theory holding that criminal acts fall
outside the scope of employment would effectively emasculate
the doctrine of corporate criminal liability. Accordingly, such
a theory has been rejected. The federal courts have established
that the illegality of the corporate employee's conduct does not
by itself place such conduct outside the scope of employment.
C. Exercise of Due Care by Corporation to Secure Employees'
Compliance
A number of commentators have argued that due diligence
and care by the corporation in preventing criminal acts of em-
ployees and agents should be a defense to a criminal action.' 7'
The principal argument in favor of a defense of due diligence
is that the purpose for imposing liability is to encourage the
corporation's efforts to secure statutory compliance by its em-
ployees.'72 That purpose is not served, this argument concludes,
where the corporation has in fact diligently supervised its em-
ployees and they violate the statute contrary to express instruc-
tions. But the defense of due diligence has not, with the excep-
tion of one notable case,' been adopted in the federal courts.'
"I Million, Limitations on the Enforceability of Criminal Sanctions, 28 GEO. L.J.
620, 646 (1940).
'"' Leigh, supra note 43, 84-87; Note, Corporate Criminal Liability for Acts in
Violation of Company Policy, 50 GEo. L.J. 547, 564-65 (1962); Hamilton, Corporate
Criminal Liability in Texas, 47 TEx. L. Rav. 60, 81 (1968).
"I' The failure to allow a corporate defense of good faith has also been criticized
on the grounds that the force of any stigma attached to a criminal conviction is
diminished when the public realizes that "corporate liability does not signify lack of
good faith on the part of corporate management." Note, Criminal Liability of Corpora-
tions for Acts of Their Agents, 60 HARv. L. REv. 283, 286 (1946).
'" Holland Furnace Co. v. United States, 158 F.2d 2 (6th Cir. 1946). There a
corporation was charged with knowingly violating a War Production Board order by
fraudulently selling a new furnace on the misrepresentation that the customer's old
furnace was damaged beyond repair. The court overturned the conviction of the corpo-
ration and held that due diligence and care of corporations to ensure compliance with
19761
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For example, in United States v. Armour and Co. 75 the corpo-
rate defendant established that it familiarized employees with
the particular regulations violated. The court rejected the due
care defense and emphasized that the case involved the non-
performance of a nondelegable duty and that it was the func-
tion delegated to the employee which determined the em-
ployee's power to engage the corporation in criminal activity.
76
In St. Johnsbury Truck Co. v. United States, 77 Chief
Judge Magruder in a concurring opinion noted that with regard
to certain ICC regulations requiring labelling of motor vehicles
and trailers transporting dangerous substances, the corporate
defendant could not avoid liability by showing that the higher
executives of the corporation "took the utmost care to lay down
for the guidance of the subordinate employees procedures de-
signed to assure compliance with the regulation."'7
In Continental Baking Co. v. United States,7 ' the Sixth
Circuit approved a jury charge to the effect that:
When the act of the agent is within the scope of his apparent
authority, the corporation is held legally responsible for it,
although it may be contrary to his actual instructions and
although it may be unlawful. 8 '
The corporation in Continental Baking Co. was charged with
conspiring to fix prices of bakery products in violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The price-fixing was engineered by
a general manager of a branch plant contrary to directions from
the "Home Office." Under these circumstances the court held
that:
criminal statutes by their employees is a defense to a criminal prosecution based solely
on the acts of the employees. The defense has been generally rejected by the federal
courts and appears to have been abandoned by the Sixth Circuit itself in Continental
Baking Co. v. United States, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960).
"I See, e.g., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir.) cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1972); United States v. Harry L. Young & Sons, 464 F.2d 1295
(10th Cir. 1972); Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120 (5th Cir.
1962); United States v. Armour & Co., 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948); Egan v. United
States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1943); United States v. E. Brooke Matlack, Inc., 149 F.
Supp. 814 (D. Md. 1957).
,T 168 F.2d 342 (3d Cir. 1948).
,1, Id. at 344.
,7 220 F.2d 393 (1st Cir. 1955).
, Id. at 397.
,7, 281 F.2d 137 (6th Cir. 1960).
,so Id. at 151.
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If in the performance of his corporate principal's business he
engaged in illegal price-fixing agreements and condoned or
encouraged activities of those under his supervision in con-
travention of written directions from the "Home Office" the
corporation cannot deny its liability for his actions. Conti-
nental cannot divorce itself from its responsible agent to
insulate itself from criminal prosecution.'1
A review of the cases suggests that the crimes of employees
and agents within the scope of employment will be imputed to
the corporate employer regardless of the corporation's good
faith efforts and explicit instructions given to secure compli-
ance.'"" The same result is reached even though the statute
requires a "knowing and willful" violation and provides that
the good faith of the defendant is a defense. Thus, the prevail-
ing view in the federal courts has rejected corporate defenses
based on the exercise of diligence in preventing criminal acts
by subordinate employees.'13
V. CRIMINAL LAW REFORM AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
The scope of corporate criminal liability as defined by the
federal courts is more extensive than the liability which would
be imposed under the proposed new Federal Criminal Code"
or the Model Penal Code drafted by the American Law Insti-
tute.
8 5
' Id. at 150. See also State v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 195 S.W. 229 (Tenn.
1892); contra, Gund Brewing Co. v. United States, 204 F. 17 (8th Cir. 1913).
,"I F. Lee Bailey & Henry Rothblatt in their manual for practitioners, DEFENDING
BUSINESS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMES 415 (1969), state that "[tlhe corporation will not
be criminally liable if, in the particular act, its agent deliberately violated his instruc-
tions and his act was not ratified or approved by the corporation." The conclusion
reached by this author is that this statement does not accurately reflect the judicial
decisions.
'0 A contrary position is expressed in the proposed FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE which
does not, with the exception of strict liability offenses, follow the prevailing view. It
would restrict the imposition of corporate criminal liability arising from the acts of
subordinate employees by allowing as a defense the exercise of due diligence by the
high managerial agent having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the
offense. The burden of proving due diligence is on the corporation. See 1 WORKING
PAPERS OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAWS, 180-81 (July 1970).
"I FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL
LAWS (1971) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE].
"' MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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The proposed Federal Criminal Code limits corporate lia-
bility for felonies to acts of management personnel, acts or
omissions by persons whom the statute defines as capable of
creating liability, or situations in which the duty of affirmative
conduct is imposed on the corporation by law.'86 Liability for
misdemeanors and offenses which do not require culpability is
imposed for conduct of any agent of the corporation who com-
mits the offense within the scope of his employment. Thus,
absent an express statutory provision, the corporation's liabil-
ity under the proposed Federal Criminal Code is somewhat
narrower than presently imposed by the federal courts.
An alternative provision in the proposed code provides for
more extensive liability.' 7 The alternative liability provision
would increase the scope to include acts of agents "done, au-
thorized, requested, commanded, ratified or recklessly toler-
ated in violation of a duty to maintain effective supervision of
corporate affairs" on the part of management.' 8
The ALI Model Penal Code formulation is in large part
reflective of liability as presently imposed by the courts. The
Model Penal Code would impose criminal liability on the cor-
poration only where: (1) The statute violated expresses a legis-
lative intent to impose liability on the corporation, (2) the act
in question is performed by an agent acting within the scope
of his office or employment, or (3) the criminal act is commit-
ted on behalf of the corporation.'
Beyond the imposition of liability for acts of agents in
violation of regulatory offenses and those statutes which are
specifically made applicable to corporations, the Model Penal
Code restricts further liability to the conduct of servants or
agents authorized, ratified, adopted, or tolerated by the corpo-
rate officers and "high managerial agents" who are sufficiently
high in the corporate hierarchy to warrant the assumption that
their acts reflect corporate policy.
The approach outlined in the Model Penal Code restrict-
ing the scope of corporate criminal liability has been followed
by at least one state court. In State v. Adjustment Department
,' FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 402(1).
' FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 402, Comment, at 35.
' FEDERAL CRIMINAL CODE § 432.
,, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07(1)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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Credit Bureau, Inc., 90 a corporation's conviction for extortion,
a specific intent crime, was reversed on grounds that a bill
collector's extortion could not be charged to the corporation
without establishing managerial capacity or that a corporate
officer or high managerial agent had authorized the act.
The court adopted the view that:
A corporation may be convicted if (a) legislative purpose
plainly appears to impose liability on the corporation for the
offense; or (b) the offense consists of an omission to perform
an act which the corporation is required by law to perform;
or (c) the commission of the offense was authorized, re-
quested, commanded or performed (i) by the board of direc-
tors, or (ii) by an agent having responsibility for formation of
corporate policy or (iii) by a 'high managerial agent' having
supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the of-
fense and acting within the scope of his employment in behalf
of the corporation. 9'
The Model Penal Code provision on corporate criminal
liability was also considered in Commonwealth v. Beneficial
Finance Co. 92 in which the corporate defendants argued that
a corporation should not be held criminally liable for the acts
of subordinate employees or agents unless authorized, ratified,
adopted, or tolerated by the corporate officers or other "high
managerial agents" who are sufficiently high in the corporate
hierarchy to warrant the assumption that their acts in some
substantial sense reflect corporate policy. The defendant's pos-
ition was based on the ALI Model Penal Code standard. The
trial court in its instructions to the jury had focused "on the
authority of the corporate agent in relation to the particular
corporate business in which the agent was engaged.' 9 3 The
instructions did not require the jury to find authorization or
reckless toleration by a corporate representative responsible for
corporate policy, but the appeals court found that the instruc-
tions "did preserve the underlying corporate policy rationale
[of] the Code by allowing the jury to infer 'corporate policy'
from the position in which the corporation placed the agent in
'H 483 P.2d 687 (Idaho 1971).
" Id. at 691.
112 275 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1971).
"I Id. at 73.
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commissioning him to handle the particular corporate affairs
in which he was engaged at the time of the criminal act." '94
The Court pointed out that:
[W]e do not think that the Model Penal Code standard
really purports to deal with the evidentiary problems which
are inherent in establishing the quantum of proof necessary
to show that the directors or officers of a corporation author-
ize, ratify, tolerate or participate in the criminal acts of an
agent when such acts are apparently performed on behalf of
the corporation. Evidence of such authorization or ratifica-
tion is too easily susceptible of concealment.
Of necessity, the proof [of] authority to so act must rest on
all the circumstances and conduct in a given situation and
the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.? 5
VI. CONCLUSION
The imposition of criminal liability has no inherent limita-
tions once the conceptual barriers are surmounted. The
"fiction theory" of corporations and the doctrine of ultra vires
were conceptual barriers which arguably restricted or entirely
precluded the imposition of liability, but they were eventually
discredited or discarded, and the corporation was viewed as an
entity capable of acting in its own right. It was at this point
that the corporation was held responsible for both torts and
crimes of its members. In order to accommodate the corpora-
tion within a legal system designed to deal with individuals,
however, the corporation was treated as a legal person whose
actions were controlled by its members. It was only a short step
then to ascribe to the corporation-that is, the legal per-
son-the acts of its members. Since the liability of the corpora-
tion is in fact derived solely from the acts of its members, these
acts are said to be imputed to the corporation. This fictional
process of imputation has no real legal significance except as a
formal bridge from the individuals who act and think to a legal
entity or legal person which can do neither. The decisions
which impose criminal liability on corporations have never
developed a comprehensive theory as to the process of
"' Id.
,, Id. at 82.
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imputation or the limitations on its use. Rather, the courts
have concerned themselves with statutory interpretation, the
nature of the acts sought to be imputed to the corporation, and
the actor's relationship with the corporation. Therefore, the
process of imputation by itself poses no barrier to the extension
of corporate criminal liability to encompass illegal activities of
subordinate actors.
Although the theory of imputation poses no limitations on
liability, it does not suggest a rationale. The decision to impose
liability on the corporation may depend upon the type of legis-
lation involved. For example, in the case of regulatory offenses,
the basis for liability appears to lie in the legal duty imposed
upon the corporation to observe the statutory mandate strictly.
It is argued that these "public welfare offenses" should not go
unpunished simply because the corporate officers did not know
of or condone the violations.
The second class of offenses involved are those imposed by
statute which require specific intent (mens rea) for their viola-
tion and a smaller number of common law crimes-such as
conspiracy, extortion, and fraud-which have been codified by
statute and also require mens rea. In general, the federal courts
have not attempted to distinguish between welfare offenses and
common law crimes such as conspiracy, fraud, and extortion,
which have been codified."' The courts have employed the
same functional test in each case to determine the scope of
liability; that is, whether the criminal act was committed
within the scope of employment.
It is the contention of this writer that courts have properly
rejected the view of commentators who argue that the corpora-
tion should be held criminally liable only for acts of the board
of directors,"' and of officers and managerial agents who com-
prise the "inner-circle."'' 18 A respondeat superior standard,
which results in holding the corporation criminally liable for
the acts of agents and subordinate employees without the re-
quirement of proof as to active illegal conduct by members of
" Leigh, supra, note 43, at 115.
'" It was early suggested that "the corporation can become liable only for acts of
shareholder-elected officers, i.e., the board of directors, acting jointly, or the individual
members of the board acting separately within their proper spheres." Note, 21 HARV.
L. REv. 535 (1908).
"I See Mueller, supra note 62, and commentators cited in note 127 supra.
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the "inner-circle," is an effective means for placing the ulti-
mate responsibility for the conduct of corporate business fully
upon the entity most responsible to society for the ultimate
harm.
Since corporate activities are performed by corporate em-
ployees at every level of the corporate hierarchy, the title or
position of the employee or agent should not be determinative
for imputing criminal responsibility to the corporation.
To permit corporations to conceal the nefarious acts of their
underlings by using the shield of corporate armour to deflect
corporate responsibility, and to separate the subordinate
from the executive, Would be to permit "endocratic" corpora-
tions to inflict wide-spread public harm without hope of
redress. It would merely serve to ignore the scramble and
realities of the market place. . . . [S]tringent standards
must be adopted to discourage any attempt by "endocratic"
corporations' executives to place the sole responsibility for
criminal acts on the shoulders of their subordinates.'99
The unwillingness of the courts to restrict criminal liabil-
ity solely on the basis of the corporate actor's status is well
considered in view of the size and complexity of modern corpo-
rations. 211 Clearly defined flowcharts which designate and de-
scribe with legal precision the position and authority of each
corporate actor generally do not exist. Even if such organiza-
"9I Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d 33 (Mass. 1971). Fur-
ther, the argument that the individual ought to be held responsible supposes that there
is an individual who can justly be dealt with. Sometimes the division of responsibility
within the corporation is so great that it is difficult to fix on an individual. In any case,
an individual cannot be made responsible for a mere omission unless there is a legal
rule attaching the duty to act to him personally. Again, where the offense results from
habits common to the organization as a whole, it may not be just to single out one
person for substantial punishment, even though he may be shown to be the actual
offender in the concrete case, since the individual is frequently subject to severe eco-
nomic pressure to conform to the practices of the organization.
m The difficulties posed by the size and complexity of modem corporations for
antitrust prosecutions has been fully explored by legal commentators. See Flynn,
Criminal Sanctions under State and Federal Antitrust Laws, 45 Txx. L. REv. 1301,
1322-1324 (1967); Watkins, Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases-Their Implication
for Government and Business, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 97, 104-08 (1961); Comment,
Criminal Prosecution for Violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act: In Search of a
Policy, 48 Gzo. L.J. 530 (1960); "[Iln the bewildering complexity and intricate ramifi-
cations of the administrative set-up in the modern 'big business' corporation, the
spheres of delegated authority and of managerial discretion are virtually impossible
to disentangle." Watkins, supra, at 107.
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tion charts were to be found, there is little reason to expect
that the actual authority of any corporate agent would coin-
cide with the authority prescribed therein. One court has
pointed out that:
In a large corporation, with many numerous and distinct de-
partments, a high ranking corporate officer or agent may
have no authority or involvement in a particular sphere of
corporate activity, whereas a lower ranking corporate execu-
tive might have much broader power in dealing with a matter
peculiarly within the scope of his authority. Employees who
are in the lower echelon of the corporate hierarchy often exer-
cise more responsibility in the everyday operations of the
corporation than the directors or officers.2"'
The criminal law now "concentrate[s] almost exclusively
on individualistic transactions"20 2 and does not focus on the
major harms visited on society by corporate actors in the name
of the corporation.103 The societal harm inflicted by corpora-
tions may in fact be qualitatively greater than the harm in-
flicted by individuals. If the criminal law is to remain relevant
to a society dominated by corporations, it will be necessary to
identify those corporations producing societal harms as a result
of criminal acts and apply appropriate sanctions to reduce such
harm effectively. Until such time as effective non-criminal
sanctions are devised the criminal prosecution serves as a less
desirable but necessary alternative.
The difficulties encountered in applying the criminal law
" Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., 275 N.E.2d at 83.
22 Seney, supra note 94, at 806, 821:
Although only the individual can be a moral agent, most significant
action today is performed not by individuals but by collectivities. . . . how
moral responsibility is to be assigned to men engaged in collective action
remains a real problem.
Kaplan, PERSPECTIVES ON THE THEME IN INDIVIDUALITY AND THE NEW SOCIETY 18-19 (A.
Kaplan ed. 1970) (cited in Seney, supra.):
The rise of the modem corporation has confronted traditional modes of
sanctioning with problems whose solution remains for the future. Traditional
sanctions designed to influence conduct in the market were originally aimed
at highly individualized targets.
R. Arens & H. Lasswell, IN DEFENSE OF PUBLIC ORDER 121-22 (1961).
m It has been suggested that the "systematic immunity" of collective entities
such as the giant private corporation is the "profound political problem of all capitalist
nations in our century." Taylor, Is the Corporation Above the Law?, 43 HARv. Bus.
REv. 119, 128 (1965).
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to reduce illegal activities of modern corporations may suggest
the need for reappraisal of our criminal law system.' 4 Our
individual-oriented criminal law may be unable to reduce the
public harm from corporate crime effectively." 5 If the societal
cost of corporate and white-collar crime does in fact exceed the
cost for crimes of violence, the need may exist for a more func-
tional approach to crime reduction. The problem may be re-
solved only when we devise "sensible functional sanctions to
promote duty fulfillment." ' 6
Obviously the need exists to devise sanctions which "strike
at more vital corporate interest" than the fine.07 Corporate
sanctions could be devised which would have an impact upon
the corporation beyond any criminal fine which may be im-
posed. A criminal prosecution can be joined with state action
to review licenses and perhaps more importantly, to review the
corporation's present dealings with government. For exam-
ple, sanctions could be devised which would require
A corporation to include in its advertising campaigns the fact
that it has violated the anti-trust laws by price fixing, or it
might be refused permission to bid on Government contracts
or partake of other forms of Government largess. Corporate
officers, managers, and directors responsible for corporate
antitrust violations might be penalized by ouster from office,
much in the same manner that the Landrum-Griffin Act pen-
alized union officials with a criminal record.208
2' See Seney, supra note 93, at 847.
2" The suggested reappraisal of our criminal law system may in the final analysis
be an ineffectual response to the major societal problem posed by corporate crime.
Richard Quinney, the sociologist, has suggested that "[o]nly fundamental change in
our political economy will make a solution to corporate crime possible." Quinney,
Crimes of Business in the American Economy, in CRIMINOLOGY, ANALYsIs AND CRTQUE
OF CRIME IN AMERICA 131-37, at 136 (R. Quinney ed. 1975). This suggestion is undoubt-
edly premised on an economic and political analysis of crime. Quinney notes that:
[C]rime in the United States rests ultimately on a materialistic, objective
base. The law that defines behavior as criminal serves the social, economic,
and political order, and is used by the state and those who control it to
preserve the capitalist system. Id. at 279.
20 Seney, supra note 94, at 793 n. 77.
21, Flynn, supra note 17, at 1332-33.
"I Id. The use of sanctions collateral to criminal fines was recently used by the
Federal Highway Administration in a highway construction bid-rigging case. The
agency originally barred three firms convicted in a 1969 bid-rigging conspiracy that
involved work on Interstate 64 in Kentucky for a period of 3 years. The bidding ban
was later reduced to 6 months, in part because of the impact of the ban on the firms.
See Courier-Journal, June 15, 1976, at C1, col. 1.
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In the absence of a fundamental reappraisal of our crimi-
nal law and the creation of a harm-based sanctioning system,
the criminal liability imposed on corporations can be taken as
a public policy properly symbolic of a level of responsibility for
corporations commensurate with their ability to commit harm-
ful acts.
One early commentator who opposed the imposition of
criminal liability on corporations stated that:
Until and unless it is demonstrated that the social good de-
mands that corporations be held responsible for crimes, there
is no sound reason for so holding them."9
The social good now demands the use of all available means to
control corporate power, including the use of criminal sanc-
tions. 10
I" Francis, Criminal Responsibility of the Corporation, 18 ILL. L. REv. 305, 323
(1924).
I" The social control of corporate power and wrongdoing is by no means confined
to criminal sanctions. The public pressure and legislative incentives recommended by
commentators on corporate social responsibility, N. JACOBY, CORPORATE POWER AND
SOCIAL REsPosIaiLrrv: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE FuTuRE (1973); new statutory controls on
the corporate structure and internal procedures of corporations proposed to create a
positive legal duty upon boards of directors and corporate officers to act in the public
interest, Stone, Cracking the Corporate Shell, THE NATION, Aug. 2, 1975, at 74-75; and
the insistence upon higher ethical standards to govern the conduct of business by
corporate leaders, N.Y. Times, March 7, 1976, § 3, at 7, cols. 1-3, are a sample of the
variety currently being offered. See also Oleck, Remedies for Abuses of Corporate
Status, 9 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 463 (1973). On the use of the Federal securities laws to
control corporate payments to domestic and foreign government officials, see Lowen-
fels, Questionable Corporate Payments and the Federal Securities Laws, 51 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 1 (1976).
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